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Abstract 
In a deregulated electricity market environment, Generation Companies (GENCOs) 
compete with each other in the market through spot energy trading, bilateral contracts 
and other financial instruments. For a GENCO, risk management is among the most 
important tasks. At the same time, how to maximise its profit in the electricity market 
is the primary objective of its operations and strategic planning. Therefore, to achieve 
the best risk-return trade-off, a GENCO needs to determine how to allocate its assets. 
This problem is also called portfolio optimization. 
This dissertation presents advanced techniques for generator strategic bidding, 
portfolio optimization, risk assessment, and a framework for system adequacy 
optimisation and control in an electricity market environment. 
Most of the generator bidding related problems can be regarded as complex 
optimisation problems. In this dissertation, detailed discussions of optimisation 
methods are given and a number of approaches are proposed based on heuristic global 
optimisation algorithms for optimisation purposes. 
The increased level of uncertainty in an electricity market can result in higher risk for 
market participants, especially GENCOs, and contribute significantly to the drivers for 
appropriate bidding and risk management tasks for GENCOs in the market. 
Accordingly, how to build an optimal bidding strategy considering market uncertainty 
is a fundamental task for GENCOs. A framework of optimal bidding strategy is 
developed out of this research. 
To further enhance the effectiveness of the optimal bidding framework, a Support 
Vector Machine (SVM) based method is developed to handle the incomplete 
information of other generators in the market, and therefore form a reliable basis for a 
particular GENCO to build an optimal bidding strategy. 
A portfolio optimisation model is proposed to maximise the return and minimise the 
risk of a GENCO by optimally allocating the GENCO's assets among different 
markets, namely spot market and financial market. 
A new market price forecasting framework is given in this dissertation as an 
indispensable part of the overall research topic. It further enhances the bidding and 
portfolio selection methods by providing more reliable market price information and 
therefore concludes a rather comprehensive package for GENCO risk management in a 
market environment. A detailed risk assessment method is presented to further the 
price modelling work and cover the associated risk management practices in an 
electricity market. 
In addition to the issues stemmed from the individual GENCO, issues from an 
electricity market should also be considered in order to draw a whole picture of a 
GENCO's risk management. 
In summary, the contributions of this thesis include: 1) a framework of GENCO 
strategic bidding considering market uncertainty and incomplete information from 
rivals; 2) a portfolio optimisation model achieving best risk-return trade-off; 3) a FIA 
based MCP forecasting method; and 4) a risk assessment method and portfolio 
evaluation framework quantifying market risk exposure; through out the research, real 
market data and structure from the Australian NEM are used to validate the methods. 
This research has led to a number of publications in book chapters, journals and 
refereed conference proceedings. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Research Background 
Following the deregulation of the power industry in many countries around the globe, 
GENCOs are increasingly aware of the need for risk management in order to achieve 
profit maximisation in the competitive market in which they are participating. The 
revenue of a typical GENCO comes from the trading in the financial market through 
various financial instruments and different options, as well as from the spot market. 
Optimal strategic bidding is a key factor which affects the position of a GENCO's 
effective trading in the spot market. 
In recent years, awareness of global warming has driven increasing numbers of 
generators running on energy resources other than coal into the market. These include 
gas fired Open Cycle Gas Turbine (OCGT) and Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) 
plants, hydro, wind farms, solar, nuclear, biomass and other forms of renewable 
sources. Many of these generators would not be able to supply base load in the 
traditional electricity market because of their relatively higher cost compared to coal-
fired generators. With the likely introduction of an Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), 
however, they will have competitive advantages over coal-fired stations and will have 
an increasing share in the electricity spot market. For those new entries, many of which, 
especially the renewable ones, such as biomass, wind, hydro and so on, are non-
scheduled1 generators in the Australian NEM [1], Those plants are facing various 
constraints such as capacity limitation and fuel supply limitations. Therefore, having 
an optimal risk management strategy is vital for them to achieve maximum profit. 
1 Generating units that were classified as scheduled generating units or non-scheduled generating units prior to 1 
May 2008 but could now be classified as semi-scheduled generating units - There is no requirement to apply to 
reclassify those generating units as semi-scheduled generating units, but there is an incentive to do so. 
From the viewpoint of an independent system operator (ISO), a bidding strategy is 
equally important because they need to run market dispatch and simulation to assist in 
operations and planning for generation as well as transmission assets. 
There are many factors affecting a generator's bidding and risk management strategies 
in a competitive electricity market. In this thesis, those important factors will be 
studied in order to form a framework for optimal generator bidding strategies and risk 
management purpose. 
Before going into more details of optimal bidding strategies and risk management, it is 
important to have an overall picture of the electricity market and the power system 
behind it. 
The power system was considered as "natural monopoly" and it had long been 
dominated by vertically integrated utilities before deregulation. From the early 1990s, 
deregulation trend in an electricity market was underway throughout the world. 
Currently, several semi-deregulated markets are operating in a number of countries, 
including US, Australia and several European countries [2], 
Generally speaking, deregulation aims at decreasing costs and lowering the electricity 
prices. Competition provides much stronger cost-minimizing incentives than typical 
regulation and drive suppliers to propose cost-saving innovations more quickly. The 
innovations include labour saving techniques, more efficient repairs, cheaper plant 
construction costs and proper investment strategies. While holding down prices, 
competition also provides incentives for more accurate pricing. Because it imposes the 
real-time wholesale spot price on the retailer's marginal purchases, wholesale 
competition should encourage real-time pricing for retail customers. A competitive 
retailer should have an added incentive to provide the option of real-time retail pricing 
because that would reflect its costs. 
The Australian NEM began operating as a wholesale market since 1998. The 
establishment of the NEM was the result of extensive consultation and collaboration 
between the states and the electricity supply industry. The reforms led to the 
disaggregation of the vertically integrated government-owned electricity authorities 
into separate generation, transmission, distribution and retail sales sectors in each state. 
The goal of the reform process was to increase competition in the industry and provide 
greater choice for end-use electricity consumers. Widely believed as a successful 
market so far, the NEM have pursued better network operation and gained greater 
profits, while it operates one of the world's longest interconnected power systems. 
More than $10 billion of electricity is traded annually in the NEM to meet the demand 
of the more than 8 million customers. All these figures indicate that the Australian 
NEM is a successful example of a deregulated electricity market. 
This deregulation has greatly increased market competition by reforming the 
traditionally integrated power utility into a competitive electricity market, which 
essentially consists of the day-ahead energy market, real-time energy market and 
ancillary services market. In a deregulated environment therefore, GENCOs are facing 
the problem of optimally allocating their generation capacities to different markets for 
profit maximization. Moreover, the generators have greater risks than before because 
of the significant price volatility in the spot energy market introduced by the 
deregulation and there is no regulated prices to guarantee return on investment. To 
hedge the risks, generators can select a number of financial instruments available in the 
electricity market, such as forward contracts, futures and options [3]. All the above 
issues can be considered as a portfolio selection problem, which aims at maximizing 
the return and minimizing the risk of a generator by allocating the generator's assets to 
different markets and financial contracts. The portfolio selection problem essentially 
consists of two sub-problems. The first sub-problem concerns designing an optimal 
bidding strategy for the generator. Due to the deregulation and correspondingly greater 
market risks, it is important for generators to minimize risk by applying appropriate 
risk management, which is the second sub-problem of generators' portfolio selection. 
The generators' portfolio selection problem involves sophisticated analysis considering 
the following key factors to achieve the best risk-return trade-off. 
• Generators' bidding strategies; 
• Generators' risk management and risk attitude; 
• Transmission system constraints and their impact on market movement; 
• Ancillary services market and system security in a market environment; 
• Impact from participating loads on the market; and 
• Challenges from environmental market schemes and CPRS. 
1.2 Generators' bidding strategies 
In a deregulated environment, market participants employ individual trading profit 
maximization, which is based on their own cost, anticipation of other participants' 
bidding behaviours and power system operation constraints, rather than cost 
minimization, as their major objective. The Poolco model is a widely employed model 
of the electricity market. In this model, generators develop the optimal bidding 
strategies, which consist of sets of price-production pairs, while the market clearing 
procedure sets the Market Clearing Price (MCP) [4], Theoretically, generators should 
bid at their marginal costs to achieve profit maximization if they are in a perfectly 
competitive market. However, the electricity market is more akin to an oligopoly 
market and generators may achieve benefits by bidding with prices higher than their 
marginal costs. Therefore, developing the optimal bidding strategies is essential for 
achieving the maximum profit and has become a major concern to GENCOs. 
In the Australian NEM, the delivery of electrical energy to market customers 
comprises a sequence of distinct processes and the Australian Energy Market Operator 
(AEMO) manages the market according to strict timetables. To enable AEMO's 
systems to facilitate supply, scheduled NEM generators are required to submit offers to 
AEMO indicating the volume of electricity they are prepared to produce for a 
specified price. Price offers of generators indicate a stack of MW levels and the 
corresponding 10 price bands as illustrated in Fig. 1-1 which shows a typical GENCO's 
bid curve in the NEM. 
Bids or offers to supply can be categorized into three different types. Daily bids are 
submitted before 12:30 pm on the day before supply is required, and are reflected in 
pre-dispatch forecasts. Generators may submit re-bids up until approximately five 
minutes prior to dispatch. In doing so, they can change the volume of electricity from 
what it was in the original offer, but they cannot change the offer price bands. 
2 According to AEMO (in An Introduction to Australia's National Electricity Market, July 2010), there are 
three types of bids or offers to supply in the NEM: (1) daily bids, (2) re-bids and (3) default bids. 
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Figure 1-1 Typical GENCO's Bid Curve in the Australian NEM 
Default bids are standing bids that apply where no daily bid has been made. These bids 
are of a 'commercial-in-confidence' nature and, in general, reflect the base operating 
levels for generators. 
Then, the bids from generators are aggregated in NEM Dispatch Engine (NEMDE) 
systems to determine which generators will be dispatched into the market, at what time 
and at what volume. This process that balances the supply and demand in the market is 
called scheduling and it also prioritizes dispatch based on cost-efficiency of supply. 
Energy offers from generators are stacked in order of rising price until demand is met. 
As energy demand increases, more expensive generators are dispatched. The 
scheduling of generators, however, may be constrained by the capacity of the 
interconnectors between the regions. When this occurs, more expensive generators will 
be dispatched to meet the demand within the region and this is also the reason for the 
difference in the electricity spot price between regions in the NEM. As shown in 
Figure 1-2, a marginal clearing price is set at the intersection point between the 
aggregated demand and supply curves for each dispatching period. It should be noted 
that in the Australian NEM, the demand curve is basically a vertical line because of the 
application of the single-side bidding protocol. The spot price for a half-hour trading 
period, which consists of six dispatching periods, would be the average of the prices of 
the six dispatching periods. All generators winning the auction are paid at the uniform 
market clearing price. 
Price ($/MWh) 
Figure 1-2 Marginal Clearing Price in a 2-Way Bidding Market 
At times, the thermal limit and stability limit of the transmission network are expressed 
as network constraints in National Electricity Market Dispatch Engine (NEMDE), 
which determines which generators are scheduled to meet demand. When some 
network constraints are activated, generators may be scheduled out of price order so 
that demand in a particular area supplied through the network can be satisfied. 
Identifying the potential for the abuse of market power is another main objective in 
investigating bidding strategies. There is a widespread belief among regulators and 
policy analysts that the deregulation of the electricity generating industry will yield 
economies in the cost of power supply by introducing competition. However, because 
the electricity industry has a relatively small number of firms, the benefits that would 
lower electricity prices may be offset. In particular, in the normal operation of markets, 
price can be well above the Short Run Marginal Cost (SRMC) of production as a result 
of pricing strategies adopted by rational firms. In economics terms, a supplier has 
market power when it can raise its price above the level dictated by competition [5]. 
Thus it is important to have as much information and clarity as possible about these 
market power effects, so that they can be mitigated before they manifest themselves to 
the detriment of consumers. 
There has been continuous research in investigating and developing generators' 
bidding strategies [6], Previous work broadly falls into two categories. The first 
category of methods employ increasingly sophisticated optimisation techniques to 
solve the optimal bidding problem. The second category applies game theory to 
investigate potential market power and develop the optimal bidding strategies. One 
problem in the above methods is the assumption on rival generators' cost information, 
bid information or benefit function is public and available or can be accurately 
predicted. However, these assumptions are often impractical because most of the 
rivals' cost, benefit and bid information are confidential in an electricity market. Given 
this background, the profit of each generator will be subject to the information it has. 
Therefore, in order to design realistic optimal bidding strategies with incomplete 
information, the unsymmetrical behaviours of suppliers should be modelled correctly. 
Unfortunately, there is a lack of research in this direction so far. And this research will 
provide detailed methodology and analysis in this respect. This thesis will describe the 
designing of proper bidding models, providing methods for handling uncertainties in 
generating optimal bidding strategies, and developing portfolio optimisation and 
evaluation frameworks in an electricity market. 
Building optimal bidding strategies is a difficult task, because bidding strategies are 
influenced by a number of complex factors, such as the following: 
• Different constraints: Every constraint employed in the bidding decision model 
influences the final bids of participants, such as technical constraints, network 
security constraints and regulatory constraints; 
• Various financial instruments: Financial derivatives, such as forward contracts 
futures, and options are employed in an electricity market. Such various types 
of contracts among suppliers, customers and retailers greatly influence the 
bidding strategies of generators; 
• Generation costs: In a market environment, it is almost impossible to know 
other generators' cost information; 
• Predicted demand and availability of generating units at power plants; 
• Predicted rivals' bidding strategies; 
• MCPs in the previous trading day: bids in the following trading days would be 
influenced by the fluctuation of previous market price; 
• Forecasting MCPs: the accuracy and reliability of the forecasting are always 
affected by the high volatility of market price; 
• Daily, weekly and seasonal patterns of loads; and 
• Types of electricity markets where the generators are participating. 
1.3 Research Challenges 
The challenges at the outset of this research include: 
• Designing proper bidding models for optimal bidding problems in a 
deregulated electricity market; 
• Analysing bidding sensitivities, i.e. how various factors influence the 
generators' bidding strategy, which is a function of those factors; 
• Providing an effective method for estimating and handling the uncertainty in 
generating optimal bidding strategies in a deregulated electricity market; 
• A portfolio optimisation framework to achieve best risk-return trade-off; 
• An effective price forecasting framework to provide more reliable market 
price information; 
• A risk assessment method and portfolio evaluation framework to achieve risk 
aims; 
In addition to the above challenges, the industry is facing increasing challenges from 
global warming concerns as well. 
Australia formally signed the Kyoto protocol in 2008 and is aiming at implementing an 
Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) in order to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions by generators. This will have a significant impact on the Australian 
generation sector, and possibly change generators' cost structure and the NEM 
dispatch order of different generators in the spot market. Clean development 
mechanism (CDM), joint implementation (JI) and carbon offset are among the most 
important concepts under the Kyoto protocol. This is one of the future topics of this 
research. 
1.4 Research objectives 
The main objectives of the research are: 
• Modelling the problem of building and investigating bidding strategies properly. 
Many different issues should be considered in designing proper bidding models. The 
relevant factors of bidding strategies should be identified and analysed to point out the 
main factors that affect the decision-making in bidding strategies of individual 
suppliers. It is essential to build a concise but expressive model to precisely describe 
the real bidding procedure and to propose an effective solution to optimal bidding 
problems. 
• Selecting effective algorithms. 
A number of optimization and simulation techniques are currently available. However, 
they cannot be applied in building bidding strategies directly. So it is necessary to 
select effective algorithms and determine whether they can be applied with some 
modifications. Otherwise completely new approaches should be proposed. 
• Estimating and handling electricity market uncertainties in developing generators' 
bidding strategies. 
As discussed before, there are many factors that may impact generators' bidding 
strategies. The uncertainties involved in the bidding procedure are introduced by these 
complex factors. There are methods which may be able to handle the uncertainties; 
however most of them are in power system analysis areas. Other methods, such as 
game theory, require a lot of information about the other market players. However, in 
the real market only a little information is available for all participants. Based on the 
literature review in this research, only a few literatures have discussed how to estimate 
and handle the uncertainties in the optimal bidding problem. Therefore, in a 
deregulated electricity market, we are facing the problem of building optimal bidding 
strategies by estimating and handling very large market uncertainties with little market 
information. To solve this problem, it is essential to propose and develop a general 
optimal bidding strategy framework, which can reliably handle the uncertainties 
involved in designing the optimal bids. 
• Building a framework for strategic bidding 
As discussed before, a major objective of our framework is to estimate and handle the 
uncertainties. To accomplish this goal, advanced data mining and statistical techniques 
will be integrated in the framework. The major steps of the framework are as follows: 
o Employing load and price forecasting techniques to forecast the future load 
and price; 
o Employing data mining and statistical methods to quantify the market 
uncertainties; 
o Building bidding scenarios; 
o Self-scheduling in optimizer; and 
o Generating bidding curves for each bidding scenarios. 
• Solving portfolio selection problem and effectively allocating assets to physical 
andfinancial markets 
GENCOs are facing the problem of optimally allocating their generation capacities to 
different markets for profit maximization. Because of the significant price volatility in 
the spot energy market introduced by the deregulation, generators also need to select 
financial hedging instruments to hedge the risks. All the above issues can be 
considered as a portfolio selection problem, which aims at best risk-return trade-off by 
allocating the generator's assets among physical and financial markets. 
• Proposing a risk assessment method and portfolio evaluation framework 
GENCOs need a proper risk assessment method and portfolio evaluation framework to 
understand, identify and quantify risk and make well-informed decisions about 
whether, and how, to deal with this source of uncertainties. 
1.5 Contributions 
This thesis presents contributions out of the PhD research in the general area of 
strategic bidding in an electricity market. It provides a rather comprehensive coverage 
in this topic. The main contributions of this thesis are summarised as follows. 
• Comprehensive overview of generation bidding and risk management research 
The state of the art of risk management and generator bidding strategies under different 
market environments are reviewed thoroughly in this thesis. It shows the advances in 
this area of research and also identifies the needs for further research for topics covered 
in this thesis. 
• New frameworks of building generator optimal bidding strategies subject to market 
uncertainties and the incomplete information from the market 
One of the most challenging difficulties in the generator strategic and optimal bidding 
problem is handling uncertainties and lack of information from the market where a 
generator participates. In this thesis, advanced methodologies including risk 
management and data analysis methods are proposed to handle such uncertainties and 
lack of information, which still allow generators to achieve optimal and strategic 
bidding. These frameworks provide very useful tools for developing GENCO's bidding 
strategies in a deregulated environment. 
• Development of generator portfolio selection framework for risk management 
purpose 
In addition to spot market trading, a generator earns even more revenue than spot 
market from the financial market. The portfolio selection framework proposed in this 
thesis optimises the portfolio return and risk in order to achieve an optimal portfolio 
selection for the generator. 
• Development of an electricity market price forecasting model 
Reliable price forecasting is essential for generator bidding and risk management. A 
fuzzy Immune Algorithm (FIA) based neural network model is proposed in this thesis 
to forecast electricity market price series. This forecasting tool forms an important part 
of the overall risk management and bidding framework proposed in this thesis. 
• Development of a new electricity trading risk assessment and management method 
Having the portfolio selection tool and basic price forecasting tool is not sufficient 
unless a proper risk management methodology is available. In this thesis, a data mining 
based method is proposed to model the volatility of electricity spot market prices and 
correlate the prices with other relevant factors. The obtained spot price model can then 
be used to obtain risk neutral process of the spot price, which provides key information 
for generator risk management. It also allows any electricity derivatives to be included 
in the risk assessment by generators. 
The frameworks incorporate research findings in price modelling, price forecasting, 
risk management, handling market uncertainty, bidding with incomplete information 
from the market, and corresponding analytical methods. This framework also includes 
contributions in optimization algorithms, data mining methods and statistical 
techniques which are closely related to this research and form an important part of the 
frameworks. Data mining methods and statistical techniques are employed to estimate 
future load and price. Statistical methods are used in estimating and handling the 
uncertainties involved in designing bidding strategies. Effective optimization 
techniques based on heuristic optimisation methods are developed and used in the 
frameworks to solve various optimisation problems involved. 
The above contributions have led to a number of publications in referred journals, 
books chapters and conference proceedings related to the thesis. The algorithms 
developed out of this research can be implemented in generation risk management 
practices as well. 
1.6 Structure of This Thesis 
The thesis is organized as follows: 
In chapter l j the background of this research, which includes the electricity market 
deregulation, market structure and bidding strategies are firstly introduced. Challenges, 
significances and objectives of this research are also given, followed by a summary of 
contributions of this research. 
In chapter 2, the literature review of the related research is presented. This includes 
three major parts: (i) the significance and meaning of bidding strategies, (ii) the 
solution to the optimal bidding problem based on game theory and optimization based 
methods, and (iii) a general framework of bidding. 
Optimisation methods are an important part of the overall research.' In chapter 3, a 
detailed discussion on optimisation and solution methods are presented. They are used 
to solve optimal bidding strategy problems throughout the research. 
In chapter 4, the bidding framework is extended to include functionalities of forming 
optimal bidding strategies under market uncertainties. Case studies based on realistic 
market data using the proposed framework are also given. The model has shown to be 
able to generate useful optimal bidding strategies. 
In chapter 5, the framework is further enhanced with the capability of handling 
incomplete information in an electricity market in order to form optimal bidding 
strategies by a GENCO. The Australian NEM data are used to test this enhanced 
framework and the results are presented in this chapter as well. 
In chapter 6, a novel portfolio selection approach is proposed. This approach enables 
GENCOs to allocate their assets in different markets and to optimally use different 
financial instruments for risk management purpose. 
In chapter 7, a new model based on fuzzy IA and RBF neural network is proposed for 
MCP forecasting purpose. Detailed analysis results based on real market data are given 
as well. This model contributes to the general framework by providing price 
forecasting functionalities in a computationally efficient and reliable way. 
The price modelling work presented in the previous chapter has been developed and a 
new risk assessment method and a portfolio evaluation framework are given in Chapter 
8. The spot price is modelled by applying a mean-reverting jump-diffusion model and 
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the relationship between spot price and relevant factors is modelled by employing a 
non-linear regression technique. The risk neutral process of the spot price is also 
developed and presented in this chapter. Finally, VaR and stress testing methods are 
employed to quantify the market risk exposure of a given portfolio supported by 
detailed case studies. This chapter completes the coverage of GENCOs bidding and 
associated risk management practices in an electricity market. 
Chapter 9 concludes this thesis with a summary of the results of this research, followed 
by the identified future research topics as continuation of the results reported in this 
thesis. 
Chapter 2 
State of the Art of Risk Management and 
Bidding for GENCO in an Electricity 
Market 
A review of related research is given in this chapter to outline the latest findings in the 
area of generators' risk management and bidding strategies. Existing literature broadly 
falls into three categories and are summarised in three main sections in this chapter. In 
section 1, existing research on modelling bidding problems is briefly discussed. These 
include research in impacts on bidding and risk management from market models, 
market structure, market types, market power, auction and bidding protocols, 
economic models and all other relevant market factors. Section 2 reviews the solutions 
to building and investigating generators' bidding strategies. Two different types of 
methods, optimization-based methods and game theory-based methods are discussed in 
detail. The key techniques relevant to this research, including forecasting, optimization, 
game theory and statistical methods, are briefly reviewed as well. Other issues and 
findings relevant to this research are presented in section 3, followed by the discussion 
and conclusion sections. 
2.1 Modelling Optimal Bidding Problems 
In order to precisely describe the bidding procedure of a specific market, several issues 
should be carefully considered to design a proper bidding model. These include the 
market factors relevant to bidding, two different objectives from GENCOs and ISO of 
bidding models, and all other relevant factors that should be taken into account in 
analysing the bidding problems. 
2.1.1 Major Market Elements 
Several major market elements should be considered to construct a concise, but 
expressive model well describing the market mechanism and bidding procedure. 
Figure 2-1 depicts a restructured electricity market operation. The Australian NEM 
follows a similar structure in market operations. Starting from market forecasting to 
establish demand levels in the NEM, the system operator - AMEO performs a series of 
activities to facilitate trading of the electricity in the NEM. The key activities include 
receiving bids from the generators, scheduling and dispatching generators, determining 
the spot market price, measuring electricity use as well as settling the national 
electricity market . The research on these elements is briefly reviewed as follows: 
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Figure 2-1 Deregulated Electricity Market Operation [3] 
2.1.2 Models of Market Mechanism 
There are three basic models in a deregulated electricity market [3]: 
• PoolCo Model. A PoolCo is a centralized marketplace that clears the market 
for suppliers and customers. ISO in a PoolCo implement the economic dispatch 
based on maximum social welfare and produce MCP. In this market, a seller 
who bids too high may lose and may not be able to sell and a buyer who bids 
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too low may not be able to buy. All winning bidders selling electricity are paid 
at the uniform MCP which is equal to the highest bid of the winners. 
• Bilateral Contracts Model. Bilateral contracts are negotiable agreements on 
trading power between suppliers and customers. The bilateral model is very 
flexible as trading parties specify their contract terms. Bilateral contracts are 
often used by traders to alleviate risks. 
• Hybrid Model. The hybrid model incorporates various features of the previous 
two models. In this model, a customer would be allowed to negotiate bilateral 
contracts with sellers or choose to purchase power at the spot market price 
from the pool. In our research, we assume the market applies the hybrid model. 
2.1.3 Market Structure and Operation 
The key concepts and issues concerning market structure and operation are given in 
this section, [3], 
2.1.3.1 Independent Market operator (ISO) and market participants 
The deregulation of electricity market has greatly changed the structure of the market 
and therefore the roles of traditional entities. In the current market, they can function 
independently and can be categorized into ISO and market participants. 
• ISO (Independent System Operator). ISO is the leading entity and its functions 
determine the market rules. As an independent control of the grid, ISO 
administrates transmission tariffs, maintains the system security, coordinates 
maintenance scheduling, and has a role in coordinating long-term planning. 
• GENCOs (Generation Companies). A GENCO operates and maintains existing 
generating plants. In a deregulated electricity market, generators employ individual 
trading profit maximization, rather than cost minimization, as their major objective. 
Therefore, building optimal bidding strategies which consist of sets of price-
production pairs is essential for achieving the maximum profit and has become a 
major concern for GENCOs. 
• DISCOs (Distribution Companies). A DISCO distributes the electricity through its 
facilities to customers in a certain geographical region. 
• TRANSCOs (Transmission Companies). A TRANSCO transmits electricity using a 
high-voltage, bulk transport system from GENCOs to DISCOs for delivery to 
customers. The transmission system is the most crucial element in an electricity 
market. A TRANSCO has the role of building, owing, maintaining, and operating 
the transmission system in a certain geographical region to provide services for 
maintaining the overall reliability of the electrical system. 
• Customers. A customer is the end-user of electricity with certain facilities 
connected to the distribution system or transmission system, according to the 
customer's size. 
• Other market entities. There are some other market entities in electricity market, 
including RETAILCOs (Retail companies), Aggregators, Brokers, and Marketers 
etc. The introduction of them is omitted here and can be found in [3], 
2.1.3.2 Market Types 
Based on trading, the market types include the energy market, ancillary services 
market, and transmission market. 
• Energy market 
The energy market is where the competitive trading of electricity occurs. The energy 
market is a centralized mechanism that facilitates energy trading between buyers and 
sellers. 
• Ancillary services market 
Ancillary services are needed for the reliability of power system. In the restructured 
industry, ancillary services are mandated to be unbundled from energy and are 
procured through the market competitively. 
• Transmission market 
In a restructured power system, the transmission network is where competition occurs 
among suppliers in meeting the demands of large users and DISCOs. The commodity 
traded in the transmission market is called transmission right. 
2.1.3.3 Market Processes 
In an electricity market, there is a vast amount of information that must be collected 
and passed between market participants. Some examples are bidding, real time 
dispatch and metering information. An overview of the market data flows and main 
systems are shown in Figure 2-2. 
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Figure 2-2 Market Information Flow 
2.1.4 Models of Market Participant Behaviours 
The three static primary equilibrium models applied in an electricity market are the 
Cournot, Bertrand, and Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) [7, 8], These models are 
essential for analysing the behaviours of market participants and their key features are 
summarised as follows, [9-11] 
• Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) 
o Entire bid functions are the strategic variables 
o Firms choose their supply functions simultaneously 
o Under the assumption that other firms' supply functions are fixed 
o A market mechanism, e.g. an ISO, then determines price and sets the 
quantity. 
The key difference among the models is the strategic variables that a firm chooses 
when competing against its rivals. The choice of strategy, e.g. price, quantity, or 
supply function, impacts the intensity of competition among the firms and the resulting 
equilibrium outcomes that the models predict. 
• Cournot 
Cournot competition is an economic model used to describe industry structure. In 
cournot model, quantity is the strategic variable and firms choose quantities 
simultaneously. An essential assumption of this model is that each firm aims to 
maximize profits, based on the expectation that its own output decision affects price, 
but will not have an effect on the output of its rivals, i.e. cournot model is under the 
assumption that other firms' quantities are fixed. 
All firms know the total number of firms in the market, and take the output of the 
others as given. Each firm has a cost function C; (g,). Normally the cost functions are 
treated as common knowledge. The cost functions may be the same or different among 
firms. The market price is set at a level such that demand equals the total quantity 
produced by both firms. Each firm takes the quantity set by its competitors as given, 
evaluates its residual demand, and then behaves as a monopoly. As a result, the market 
price is higher than the purely competitive price but less than the monopoly price. 
The most common application of Cournot model to an electricity market is based on 
the presumption that generators do not change their production levels if their 
competitors' productions are given. The application of Cournot model also because its 
simplicity and computational flexibility. For example, ISO in POOLCO markets can 
determine MCP in Cournot model. 
The applicability of the Cournot model in the electricity market depends on the 
different modelling objectives and what market features that the model intends to 
capture. Whether to use the Cournot model or not must be analysed on a case-by-case 
basis according to specific market context. GENCOs strategically bid into the market 
to maximise their profits in an oligopolistic electricity market. This is basically a non-
cooperative game, and the solution to the game is Nash equilibrium. At this 
equilibrium, each player (GENCO) cannot benefit by changing its current strategy 
while keeping other players strategies unchanged. Cournot model is a common model 
for oligopolistic market. In [12], an oligopolistic model with Cournot generators and 
regulated transmission prices is proposed. Transmission constraints and arbitrage are 
studied when forming Nash-Cournot models are given in [13]. 
The Cournot model is a quantity setting model and is more appropriate than Bertrand 
when the number of firms is small. 
• Bertrand [ 14] 
Bertrand competition is a model of competition used in economics. In this model, 
firms compete against each other using prices as strategy choices. Specifically, it is a 
model of price competition between duopoly firms which results in each charging the 
price that would be charged under perfect competition, known as marginal cost pricing. 
The model has the following assumptions. Firstly, it is assumed that firms produce 
homogeneous products and they do not cooperate. Secondly, firms have the same 
marginal cost (MC) which is constant and possess the capability to supply sufficient 
output to satisfy demand, so other firms' prices are fixed. Thirdly, all firms compete 
solely in price to maximize its profit, and choose their respective prices simultaneously 
and non-cooperatively. There is strategic behaviour by both firms based on their 
correct expectation of rival's price choice. In addition, demand is linear in this model. 
Another assumption is that consumers buy everything from the cheaper firm or half at 
each, if the price is equal. 
In classic Bertrand model, price competition yields an equilibrium price equal to 
marginal cost. In the electricity market, generators face capacity constraints. So to 
apply the Bertrand model to analyse price competition in electricity market, it is 
important to account for capacity constraints, as well as for the rationing rule for 
demand, since the nature of these assumptions may affect the outcome of equilibrium. 
Besides, electricity is conducted through wires, and the consumers and generators are 
connected by transmission lines. Thus the marginal transmission cost, plus marginal 
production cost add up to total marginal cost. Consequently, generators in two 
different regions may have different costs. It is possible for generators to increase the 
price in one region and sometimes the increase is not cost-based. 
The applicability of Bertrand model in electricity market depends on the different 
modelling objectives and what market features that the model is intended to capture. In 
general, Bertrand competition may realistically competing firms' marginal costs are 
relatively 'flat' and excess capacity exists. However, whether to use Bertrand model or 
not must be analysed on a case-by-case basis according to specific market context. 
• Supply Function Equilibrium Model [13] 
In the SFE model, firms bid entire supply functions under the assumption that other 
firms' supply functions are fixed, and the resulting price equilibriums generally are 
between the Bertrand and Cournot outcomes. This model can be used to apply 
imperfect competition in which firms compete with each other through the 
simultaneous choice of supply functions. Klemperer & Myer developed SFE to model 
the competition in the market with demand uncertainties. This model is more 
appealing than the Bertrand and Cournot models because it allows for a strategy space 
in which competing firms choose entire supply functions. 
The major weakness of SFE model is that it is difficult to calculate the equilibriums 
without restrictive assumptions on the number of firms and the form of firm cost, 
capacity constraints and the bid (supply) functions. 
Different market participant behaviours are important in determining an optimal 
bidding strategy for a GENCO. These models are considered in methodologies to 
designing optimal bidding strategies. The key differences of these models are mainly 
with the selection of strategic variables by a firm when competing against its rivals. 
They can be summarised as follows: 
• The Cournot model uses quantity as the strategic variable and is more 
appropriate than Bertrand model when the number of firms is small; 
• The Bertrand model uses price as the strategic variable and all firms choose 
their prices simultaneously and non-cooperatively to compete aiming at profit 
maximization in a market; and 
• The SFE model uses supply function as the strategic variable and can be used 
to apply imperfect competition in a market. 
2.1.5 Market Power 
Market power [15] is manifested when an owner of a generation facility is able to exert 
a significant influence on pricing or on the availability of electricity. If a seller or a 
group of sellers own the ability to increase the spot price over a competitive level, 
control the total output, or exclude competitors from a relevant market for a significant 
period of time, it is defined that the seller or sellers have market power. If a generator 
is said to have market power, this generator can successfully increase its profits by 
strategic bidding or by any means other than lowering its costs. Market power may be 
exercised intentionally or accidentally and could hamper the competition in power 
production. 
So authorities, like ISO, must identify and correct situations in which some market 
participants exercise market power. 
Market power can generally be defined as the ability of a particular seller, or a group 
of the sellers, to influence the prices of a product to their advantage over a sustained 
period of time. The Price-Cost Margin Index (PCMI) is widely employed to measure 
the extent of market power abuse in a Poolco. The PCMI quantifies the degree to 
which the price of a product in a market deviates from what would be its 'perfectly 
competitive' price. The PCMI is a retrospective indicator of market power, defined as: 
Actual Product Price - Perfectly Competitiv e Product Price 
PCMI = „ , , ^ . . ^ , ^ . x 100% (2.1) 
Perfectly Competitiv e Product Price 
where the 'Perfectly Competitive' price is equal to the marginal cost of electricity 
generation [11]. 
The PCMI has a minimum value of zero-implying a perfectly competitive market, and 
an unbounded maximum value. A PCMI value of 100%, for example, means the price 
of a product is twice the price that would be expected if the market were perfectly 
competitive. The PCMI is a level that can be used to measure whether a market is 
competitive or not. 
Market concentration is a measure of the number of firms in a given market. The 
degree to which market power can be exercised in a given market is largely a function 
of market concentration. However, this degree also depends upon the structure of the 
market, the nature of a particular product being sold in this market, the ease of market 
entry for new firms, and the price elasticity of demand for the product. In this research, 
the market concentration is quantified by the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI), 
which is defined as: 
HHI = Y, S ? = 1 0 0 % (2.2) 
where St is the share of each firm in the market. HHI may be adopted as a proxy for 
market power in evaluating proposed mergers between firms in the market [16]. 
In examining market power, according to the type of interaction that they assume 
about the behaviour of participants, the three models, namely Cournot, Bertrand, and 
Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE), which have been introduced in Section 2.1.5 can 
be applied [7]. 
2.1.6 Auction Methods 
Bidding has a strong relationship with the auction mechanism in a market. Bidding 
strategies should be developed according to market models and activity rules. The 
auction rules and bidding protocols are the most important two among these rules. 
Figure 2-3 illustrates a generator's typical bid curve, which consists of sets of price-
production pairs. ISO implements the market clearing procedure and sets the MCP 
based on all the bids from market participants. 
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Figure 2-3 A Typical Bidding Curve of a Generation Company in the Australian NEM 
An auction is a market institution with an explicit set of rules determining resource 
allocation and prices on the basis of bids from the market participants. The auction 
mechanism has been a preferred choice of setting prices for electricity markets. It is an 
economically efficient mechanism to allocate demand to suppliers, and the structure of 
electricity markets in many countries is based on auctions. 
Auction methods can be categorized into static and dynamic ones. In static ones, the 
bidders submit sealed bids simultaneously. In dynamic ones, the bidders can observe 
other competitors' bids and may revise their own sequentially. In terms of 
discriminating pricing or non-discriminating pricing, bidders in static auctions are paid 
their offered prices or a uniform price. 
Auctions can also be classified as open or sealed-bid. Open auctions may be classified 
as English (descending) or Dutch (ascending). Sealed-bid auctions are non-
discriminating auctions. Almost all operating electricity markets employ the sealed bid 
auction with uniform market price. 
2.1.7 Bidding Protocols 
The bidding protocols can be classified as multipart bid or single-part bid according 
the price components included in bids. 
A. Multi-part Bid 
A multi-part bid, also called a complex bid, consists of separate prices for ramps, start-
up costs, shut-down costs, no-load operation, and energy. In another word, both cost 
structure and technical constraints are comprised in this kind of bid. By employing a 
multi-part bid, bid prices, technical constraints and related economic information can 
be taken into account. A well-known example of the multi-part bid is the England 
Wales electricity market. 
B. Single-part Bid 
In a single-part bid, generators bid only independent prices for each trading interval. 
Based on the intersection of supply and demand bid curves, the market clearing 
process is conducted to decide the winning bids, MCP and schedules for each dispatch 
period. This scheme is decentralized. Generators need to internalize all involved costs 
and technique constraints in developing their bids to make their own unit commitments 
while in multi-part bids, these will be done by the market operator. The single-part bid 
has been implemented in several electricity markets, such as Australia, California, 
Norway, and Sweden. 
There are many publications aimed at building bidding strategies for this type of 
market, which employs single-part bid [17, 18]. 
2.1.8 Other Factors Relevant to Bidding 
In order to deal with the uncertainties in an electricity market, different factors should 
be considered in developing optimal bidding strategies. 
A. Risk Management 
In a deregulated market, one of the main factors is risk. In [18-20], different methods 
for building optimal bidding strategies for generators according to their degree of risk 
aversion are discussed. Generators compete through both the spot market and financial 
market. Because of the price volatility in the spot market, generators have to consider 
the various financial derivatives that they have chosen to achieve their risk 
management aims when they build their optimal bidding strategies into the spot market 
[21]. 
B. Transmission and Technical Constraints 
Congestion influence has been considered in [22] and other technical limitations of 
generating units are comprised in the optimization problem in [23, 24], 
C. Coordination with Ancillary Services Market 
In [25, 26], developing optimally coordinated bidding strategies in energy and 
spinning reserve markets is considered. Each generator bids a linear energy supply 
function and a linear spinning reserve supply function to the energy and spinning 
reserve market. The two markets are dispatched separately to minimize customer 
payments. To obtain maximum profit, each generator chooses the coefficient in the 
linear supply functions, subject to expectations about how his or her rivals will bid. 
D. Rivals' Information 
Rival's information is another important factor relevant to the bidding problem. 
Sometimes, it is assumed that rival generators' cost information, bid information or 
benefit function is public and available. For example, in [24], it is assumed that a 
generator knows all the other competitors' cost information. In [5], each generator 
anticipates a value for the bid from each of the other market rivals. In [27], the 
parameters in rivals' bids are assumed to be available as discrete distributions. In [28], 
it is assumed that each market participant can estimate its competitors' benefit 
functions and their minimum and maximum values. However, these assumptions are 
often impractical because most of the cost, benefit and bid information of rivals are 
confidential in an electricity market. 
Given this background, the profit of each generator will be subject to the information it 
has. Therefore, in order to design realistic optimal bidding strategies with incomplete 
information, the unsymmetrical behaviours of suppliers should be modelled correctly. 
Unfortunately, there is a general lack of research in this direction so far. 
E. Single-side and Double-side Auction 
Bidding strategies are also subject to the market mechanism. In [29], a framework for 
testing and modifying bidding strategies by using Genetic Algorithm (GA) was 
proposed. In this chapter, DISCOs and GENCOs buy and sell electricity via double 
auctions implemented in a regional commodity exchange. In [30], the comparison of 
efficiency and competitiveness are conducted between double-sides and single-sides 
(supply-only) auction. 
F. System Marginal Price Auction and Pay as Bid Auction [30] 
In a System Marginal Price (SMP) auction, the final MCPs and profits of GENCOs are 
determined by the highest bid price being dispatched by ISO through the market 
clearing process. Unless a particular GENCO sets the price during market clearing 
process, there is less relationship between the price and the GENCO's own bid price. 
Consequently, in a perfect competitive market, the increment of GENCO's profit is 
realized mainly through production cost reduction. The main concern of a GENCO (or 
more generally an electricity seller) in bidding is how to make sure itself is being 
dispatched in market clearing; as a result, bidding at lower prices is a less risky 
approach. 
Figure 2-4 Probability distributions of prices for the SMP auction vs. the PAB auction [31] 
<0>: least probable, ..., <5>: most probable 
Bold lines stand for the most probable bid curves of a risk-neutral seller. 
Lavg : average production price; Lmag : marginal price; Lobj : price needed to gain 
desired profit; Emin : the lower bound of the bidding capacity, Emax • the upper bound of 
the bidding capacity 
For a SMP auction, Figure 2-4 (a) shows the relationship between the amounts of 
electricity traded vs. prices. The probability variations are assumed in a gradual 
manner. Among the three bid curves, the marginal price curve Lmag is a risk-neutral 
seller's most probable bid curve (bold line) which aims at reducing the risks of profit 
losses. In a Pay as Bid (PAB) auction, the final market prices are determined by 
GENCOs' actual bid prices, and thus their profits are determined by themselves. 
GENCOs have to consider the possibilities of being dispatched at their own bidding 
prices as well as their profits targets. The distribution of bid prices in a PAB auction 
market is given in Figure 2-4(b). In a PAB auction market, the most probable bid for a 
risk-neutral GENCO is L0bj in order to meet its profit objective. Under PAB, the 
GENCOs bear more risks and the bid prices are generally higher than those of SMP 
(a) SMP (b) PAB 
auctions. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that because the MCP under SMP is 
determined by the most expensive bid price dispatched, this introduces an increment of 
the average price, which is not necessarily always lower than that of the PAB auction 
market, and vice versa. The relationship between SMP auctions and PAB auctions 
becomes more complicated if other factors such as social benefits and market 
efficiencies are considered, [29], 
The authors in [30] propose that under competitive and monopoly markets, PAB 
auction mechanisms can reduce average prices; however, it also reduces demand for 
electricity. This results in reduction in generation as well. Moreover, in a monopoly 
market with very high uncertainties in demand, the PAB auction mechanism may 
cause more reduction in demand. When market dynamics and the entry and exit 
activities are considered, PAB auction will prevent smaller participants and base-load 
generators from entering the market, and will introduce more market power. 
According to [32], in a perfect competition market, a SMP auction has higher market 
efficiency. Moreover, PAB auction tends to compensate GENCOs based on their price 
forecast ability rather than on their efficiency relative to other GENCOs [33], Based on 
market simulation, authors in [29] also demonstrate that PAB auction leads to higher 
prices than SMP auction. This is because bid prices are confidential to GENCOs, 
therefore GENCOs with large market share have more information advantages, and are 
more likely to bid at higher prices in order to achieve their profit objectives. Although 
SMP auction is outperformed in consumer surplus by a PAB auction, however, the 
SMP auction shows more efficiency and it is still difficult to rank the overall welfare 
between the two approaches [29]. 
UK's New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) [34], although it has later on not 
been used for some years, started from 27th March 2001, used a contract market for 
scheduled power and a PAB auction to replace SMP auction for balancing purposes. It 
is concluded that the objectives of the auction reform have been achieved, [34, 35], 
However, a different view was given by [36] in this regard. Following the California 
energy crisis in summer, 2000, PAB auction mechanism was tested from 8' December 
2000 to 31st January 2001 by the US Federal Electricity Council [37]. During test 
period, PAB auction was used when the system marginal price went above the soft 
price cap; and SMP was employed otherwise. The test did not quite meet the 
expectations and was terminated. According to California ISO[37, 38], PAB auction 
had virtually no control over market power; most non-utility GENCOs were paid at 
prices higher than the soft price cap which is actually the single price auction 
threshold. It is further claimed in [31, 38] that a PAB auction could not solve the 
problems faced by a SMP auction. A SMP auction is more effective in reducing 
gaming in a market. It is beneficial for GENCOs with higher efficiency. Currently, 
SMP auctions are used in most electricity markets around the world, with the help of 
the bilateral market mechanism. 
G. Beta pricing auction 
Although SMP is more widely accepted than PAB, there are some areas where PAB 
outperforms SMP. In order to explore the advantages of both, Beta pricing auction is 
proposed in [39] where the price paid to the GENCO is a weighted sum of its bids and 
the MCP. Being a trade-off between the PAB auction and the SMP auction 
mechanisms, Beta pricing auction, is still complex and carries no clear advantages over 
PAB and/or SMP. 
H. Vickery auction and Vickery-Clarke-Groves auction 
Vickery auction refers to the second-price sealed-bid auction [40]. Vickery-Clarke-
Groves auction is a generalization of the Vickery auction. The common advantage of 
them is that that they tend to motivate GENCOs to submit bids more close to their true 
costs [40, 41]. However they also have some disadvantages: 
• The auctioneers are generally not self-funding and may run a deficit, and 
consequently the auctioneer may cheat; 
• There is a danger for the GENCOs to reveal their true cost information to 
others; and 
• There is no MCPs. 
These disadvantages make Vickery auction and VCG auction rare in reality. According 
to the comparisons given in [41], it is hard to find a particular auction mechanism 
which generally outperforms others. The authors in [31] proposed a new composite 
auction mechanism to explore the advantages of SMP and PAB mechanisms. Their 
application is mainly to reduce undesirable price spikes in the market. 
I. Different Types of Generators 
Empirical analysis about different bidding behaviours of different types of generators 
in NEM can be found in NEMMCO website [42], 
In a deregulated electricity market, generators have freedom to design bidding 
strategies by taking several factors into account [20], The main factors influencing 
bidding strategies include technical limitations of generating units and various 
categories of contracts. Usually, generators' limitation on energy generation will 
greatly influence the amount of contracted electricity. Thermal generators enter 
contracts covering the entire trading day subject to their own technical constraints. If 
they could not be dispatched and the spot price is higher than the contract strike price, 
the generator would have to buy the electricity from the pool market to fulfil the 
contract. So they usually bid at low prices for their contracted electricity in order to be 
scheduled at their contracted capacity. This would result in revenue losses. Some 
hydro power stations with limited water resources and gas power stations with high 
cost of fuel are peak generating units. Most of their costs are recovered by strategic 
bidding in high price trading intervals in the spot market or entering financial 
instruments, such as caps, in the financial market. At the same time, they are usually 
contracted by ISO to provide ancillary services or as system reserve units during peak 
hours. 
2.2 Solutions to Building and Investigating Bidding Strategies and 
Relevant Techniques 
2.2.1 Two Solutions to Bidding Problem 
A. Optimization-based Solution 
The Optimization-based Solution employs increasingly sophisticated optimization 
techniques to solve the optimal bidding problem. 
In [43], authors solve a two-level optimization problem in their models. In the first 
level, generators maximize the profit by building a profitable bid and submitting to 
ISO. In the second level, ISO dispatches power and solves the fundamental problem of 
market clearing to minimize the overall system cost. Different optimization techniques 
are used to solve the formulated problems. These techniques include Lagrangian 
Relaxation [27] , Optimal Power Flow (OPF) [43], Evolutionary Computation (EC), 
mainly Genetic Algorithms (GAs) [20], Evolutionary Programming (EP) [44] , and 
Evolutionary Strategy (ES) [45] , Monte Carlo (MC) methods [46] , to mention only a 
few. A more detailed description of optimisation is given in Chapter 3. 
B. Game Theory-based solution 
The second category applies game theory to investigate potential market power and 
develop the optimal bidding strategies. Game theory is a discipline that is employed to 
analyse problems of conflict among interacting decision-makers. Generally game 
theory can be classified into two categories, cooperative and non-cooperative. In an 
electricity market, game theory can be used to analyse how market structures and 
market rules affect the optimal bidding strategies of GENCOs and how the market 
participants exercise market power potentially. Apart from that, game theory can also 
be used to build GENCOs' bidding strategies considering the possibilities of rival's 
behaviours and study ancillary services pricing. 
• Investigating bidding strategies with Game Theory 
Game theory is widely used to analyse how market structures and market rules affect 
the optimal bidding strategies of generators and how the market participants exercise 
their potential market power [16, 24, 47-49], The authors of [50] apply game theory to 
simulate the decision making process for defining offered prices in a deregulated 
environment from the market operator's point of view. There are two kinds of games, 
namely non-cooperative and cooperative games are considered in this thesis. These 
methods can be used to analyse the strategic bidding behaviour of generators or other 
players in a deregulated electricity market. In [24], the authors propose to model 
generators' bidding strategies by using supply function equilibrium (SFE). In [47], the 
competition among market participants is modelled as a non-cooperative game with 
incomplete information. This method can be used for electricity pricing. In [49], the 
authors apply game theory to analyse the power transactions in a deregulated 
electricity market. 
• Building Bidding Strategies with Game Theory 
In addition to these applications, game theory can also be applied to study ancillary 
services pricing and to build generators' bidding strategies considering rivals' 
behaviours [28, 51-53]. A method is proposed in [28] for developing dynamic Nash 
strategies for load serving entities (LSE) in energy multi-markets. This optimal 
problem is formulated using dynamic game theory. In [51], the authors model the 
electricity market as an oligopoly market and employ Nash-Cournot strategies to solve 
the bidding strategy problem. In [52], NE bidding prices could be obtained by using 
network optimization techniques. In [53], the authors transform the game with 
incomplete information into a game with complete information by using the Bayes 
Rule. 
2.2.2 Optimization Techniques 
Optimisation techniques are used intensively in this research. The key optimisation 
methods in the literature are reviewed here. More detailed analysis on optimisation is 
given in Chapter 3. 
A. Evolutionary Computation (EC) 
EC [54] is a type of optimization algorithms originated from natural evolution 
principles. It is robust, adaptive and has found its application in a wide variety of 
theoretical and practical problems involving search and optimization tasks. Being 
different from the traditional calculus based optimization techniques, EC is based on a 
population of encoded tentative solutions, which are processed with some evolutionary 
operators to find a good acceptable solution if not the global optimum one. The search 
and optimization process follows the principle of the survival of the fittest to generate 
successively better results over generations to finally approximate the optimal 
solutions. In general, EC algorithms broadly fall into three categories, which have all 
been successfully applied in power system research. More detailed descriptions of the 
optimisation methods used are given in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
B. Optimal Power Flow (OPF) 
In [55], He and Song present a method for building optimal bidding strategies with 
taking into account cost-recovery, physical constraints and market price fluctuation 
resulting from other competitors' bidding strategies. By employing probabilities to 
represent rivals' bidding strategies, the Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs) and 
schedules could be obtained by a market price simulator based on OPF. The market-
oriented Unit Commitment (UC) model is applied in this thesis to develop the 
incremental step-cased price/output bidding curves with the corresponding 
probabilities. The theory of Multiple Criteria Decision-Making (MCDM) has been 
employed to obtain the optimal bidding strategy with the best compromise among its 
payoff, market share and probability. 
The authors in [56] presented the concept of bids sensitivities which include the first-
order derivatives of nodal prices, generation outputs, unit profits and transmission line 
power flow with respect to each generator's bids. Each generator bids the coefficient 
of its quadratic cost function. Based on the Interior-Point OPF (IPOPF) model, the 
bids' sensitivities can be derived and each generator can use the IPOPF model to build 
its optimal bidding strategy with taking into both its own profit maximization and the 
system securities. 
The authors in [43] presented a two-level model of a deregulated electricity market in 
which an ISO solves an OPF based on the maximization of social welfare and the 
generators choose their bids in order to maximize their profits under constraints and 
their dispatch and price obtained from OPF. 
Paper [57] focused on the impacts of potential coalitions on GENCOs' bidding 
strategies in a deregulated electricity market. The generator under consideration is 
grouped with other generators and non-cooperative and cooperative gaming are 
respectively applied among and within subgroups. Within each subgroup, the members 
coordinate their bidding strategies to obtain a common goal. The paper presents an 
algorithm for the members in each coalition subgroup by introducing bids sensitivities. 
The method is essentially based on IPOPF model. All the potential combinations of 
coalition used by the considered generator are given in a priority list. 
In [55], the authors established a two-level optimization model based on an IPOPF. 
This model can be used to obtain bids sensitivities, which can be used to produce 
optimal bids for an individual generator. 
C. Mixed-integer Optimization 
Authors in [58] presented an integrated bidding and scheduling framework for building 
optimal bidding strategies with risk management under a deregulated electricity market. 
The authors establish a stochastic mixed-integer optimization formulation to deal with 
the MCP uncertainties, bidding risk management, and self-scheduling requirements 
from each unit. Finally, the selection of bidding curves for both energy and reserve 
markets has been conducted by using an optimal solution method based on Lagrangian 
Relaxation (LR) and stochastic dynamic programming method. 
D. Lagrangian Relaxation (LR) 
Using Lagrangian Relaxation (LR) as an auction method for bidding may have trouble 
in choosing some subsets of them for the optimal solution if many units are similar. 
The authors in [59] presented an alternative bidding strategies to achieve an advantage 
and provided some sensitivity analysis results. 
Zhang et al [27] proposed a method for building optimal bidding strategies and 
executing self-scheduling when a generator bids part of its energy and self-schedules 
in New England. With appropriate simplification of the bidding and ISO models, the 
closed-form ISO solutions are first achieved. With these solutions, the generator's 
bidding and self-scheduling model is solved by using Lagrangian Relaxation. 
E. Ordinal Optimization 
Based on the theory of ordinal optimization, paper [60] presents a bidding strategy 
which optimization goal is finding 'good enough' solution. The basic idea here is to 
use approximate model that describes the influence of bidding strategies on the MCPs. 
After having got the good enough bids set S, the best bid could be obtained by solving 
full hydrothermal scheduling or unit commitment problems for each of the bids in S. 
F. Differential Equations 
The authors in [61] explore generators' bidding behaviour in electricity auction market 
under clearing price rule and the sellers' optimal bidding strategies are derived by 
solving a set of differential equations that specify the necessary conditions for bidders 
to maximize their expected payoffs. A further study shows that the generators have 
incentives to bid above their production cost. The amount of makeup depends on the 
probability of winning below and on the margin computed from rivals' cost 
distribution function, market demand and number of competitors. 
G. Learning Automata 
In [62], learning automata are employed to solve the problem of optimal bidding 
strategies due to its uncertainties and dynamics in the electricity market. Learning 
automata are applied to solve this complex optimization problem in this paper. This 
method has a greatly flexibility and distinct advantages because it is a model-free 
method. 
H. Reinforcement Learning 
Paper [63] presents a modified reinforcement learning (Q-learning) based on 
temperature variation and it is applied to build optimal bidding strategy for a generator 
in a deregulated electricity market. The main advantage of this method is that no 
rivals' information is required. The authors further discover that even if all generators 
use this method, they will still stay in Nash Equilibrium. 
In [64], the supplier bidding strategy is formulated as a kind of stochastic optimal 
control problem based on Q-learning algorithm. The presumption here is that there is 
no supplier that possesses the market power in the competitive day-ahead electricity 
auction market and they will bid into the market each hour. The authors study the 
influences of supplier's strategic bidding on the market price under uniform pricing 
rule and discriminatory pricing rule. 
I. Golden Selection Method 
Authors in [65] presented a new method for developing optimal bidding strategies with 
risks taken into account for GENCOs in a pool-based single-buyer electricity market. 
Each generator bids in the linear supply function for realizing two contradictory 
objectives: profit maximization and risk minimization. A stochastic model is 
formulated and Golden Selection Method is employed to solve the problem. 
J. Markov Decision Process 
The authors in [66] developed an optimal bidding strategy by solving a problem 
formulated in the framework of Markov Decision Process (MDP), which is a discrete 
stochastic optimization method. The temporal difference technique and actor-critic 
learning algorithm are employed to optimize the object functions. 
In [67], the decision-making problem is formulated as a MDP - a discrete stochastic 
optimization method. All opponents are modelled by their bidding parameters with 
corresponding probabilities. A systematic method is developed to calculate transition 
probabilities and rewards. The presumption is the decision maker is risk-neutral. 
2.3 Other Relevant Research 
2.3.1 Bidding Strategies Analysis 
Paper [68] provides a method for monitoring the generator bidding behaviour. The 
authors introduce the concept of a strategy curve and use it to represent generator 
bidding strategies. This bid curve can reveal any deviation in GENCO's bid price from 
the costs of GENCOs. 
The authors in [69] analyse the historical data for the period from May 1, 2002 to May 
31, 2003 to identify and examine the behaviour of generators' bidding strategies in the 
Australian National Electricity Market (NEM). Further analysis shows that generators 
more frequently use capacity offers as a strategic tool than price offers. 
2.3.2 Bidding in Transmission Auction Markets 
In [23, 70], the authors propose a Financial Transmission Right (FTR) bidding model 
for transmission auction markets with taking risks into account. There are two levels in 
this model. The upper sub-problem representing bidders and the lower one 
representing the solution to ISO's FTR market clearing problem for maximizing the 
revenue obtained from the FTR auction. This problem is solved by developing the 
sensitivity of a bidder's expected utility with respect to its bidding strategies. 
2.3.3 Estimating Rivals' Bidding Behaviours 
Paper [71] proposes a methodology for developing bidding strategies for generators by 
using possibility theory. The authors apply fuzzy set to represent the estimated bidding 
behaviours of opponents based on historical data, the available production cost data 
from the power industry restructuring and experts' heuristic knowledge. Hence, a 
fuzzy programming model is developed to solve the problem. 
The authors in [72] present the formulation and features of the Price Based Unit 
Commitment (PBUC) in a deregulated power market. By using the model presents in 
this paper, GENCOs can maximize their own profits when they are responsible for unit 
commitment, to commit and schedule their units for selling power, purchasing power, 
selling spinning and non-spinning reserves. By employing locational marginal prices 
(LMPs) in PBUC, the transmission congestion is incorporated. This paper also 
represents the derivation of the bidding strategy as a function of generation schedule. 
2.4 Discussions 
As identified from the literature review, one problem in the existing methods is the 
assumption that rival generators' cost information, bidding information or benefit 
function is public or available. For example, in [24], it is assumed that a GENCO 
knows all the other competitors' cost information. However, these assumptions are 
often impractical because of such rivals' information are usually confidential in a 
competitive electricity market. Given this background, the profit of each generator will 
be subject to the information it has. Therefore, in order to design realistic optimal 
bidding strategies with incomplete information, the unsymmetrical behaviours of 
suppliers should be modelled correctly. Unfortunately, there is a lack of research in 
this aspect so far. 
Furthermore, there are complex factors that introduce uncertainties into electricity 
market and will greatly influence generators' bidding behaviours. Because of the great 
number of uncertainties that exist in a competitive electricity market, as well the lack 
of the competitors' information, which is essential for building bidding strategies, 
previous methods may be able to be applied to solving the decision-making problem in 
this research, however, the results are still far from satisfactory. 
The following chapter will introduce our framework of optimal bidding strategies 
under market uncertainties and later on enhanced framework to handle incomplete 
information in the market. The framework will be further enhanced to effectively 
handle both bidding into the spot market and financial instruments in financial market, 
which are widely used for risk hedging in a deregulated electricity market. Further 
improvement of the proposed framework enables it to handle more related influence 
factors, constraints and uncertainties from the market. 
2.5 Conclusion 
The literature review of the research on GENCO's optimal bidding strategies and risk 
management problem was presented in this chapter. Firstly, major market elements are 
reviewed and discussed. These elements comprise models of market mechanism, 
market structure and operation, market types, market power, auction and bidding 
protocols and models of market participant behaviours. How the Australian NEM fits 
into these market models was commented as well. These market issues are considered 
in this research to build optimal bidding strategies for generators and investigate 
generators' bidding behaviours. In the second part, two main solutions to building and 
investigating generators' bidding strategies are reviewed, namely optimization-based 
method and game theory-based method. In addition, other key techniques relevant to 
this research, including forecasting, optimization, game theory and statistical methods 
are briefly reviewed as well. 
Chapter 3 
Optimisation Methods 
3.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 2, building optimal bidding strategies, solving portfolio 
selection problem and modelling the risk management are basically optimisation 
problems and require suitable optimisation methods in order to obtain the optimal 
solutions. In this chapter, multi-objective optimisation problem is firstly discussed. 
The detailed description of a number of Evolutionary Computation (EC) methods is 
given subsequently. These EC based methods are used in the following chapters to 
obtain optimal bidding strategies in a competitive electricity market. 
The EC based optimisation methods have been used in this research to form various 
bidding strategies as a useful global optimisation tool. Some advances in EC are also 
developed through the research. It is necessary to give an overview of the main EC 
techniques used in this research. 
3.2 Multi-objective Optimisation 
3.2.1 Function Optimization Formulation [73] 
Optimization methods involve searching the solution space for values of variables 
which are corresponding to desirable objective function values, being either maximum 
or minimal. These include bidding problems which can be summarized as to maximize 
the profit subject to market and system constraints. It is necessary to briefly discuss the 
formulation for an optimization problem. Because maximization problems can be 
easily converted into minimization ones, only minimization problems are discussed 
here. 
A general constrained minimization problem can de described as 
min y - f { X ) = {/,(x),f2(x),...,fM(*)} (3.1) 
US Yn x 
s.t. 
g(x) < 0 (3.2) 
where x = {*;}, i = 1,2, . . . ,« , is the vector of variables where an optimal value is to be 
calculated to minimize y; f(x) = {fj(x)},j = 1, 2,..., mh is the vector of objective 
functions, and g(x) = {g/t(x)}, k =1, 2,..., m2, is the vector of equality and inequality 
constraints. Let m = m\+rri2 and assume that x is represented as a vector of floating 
numbers. 
This minimization problem can be further represented as 
Min F(x) (3.3) 
where F(x) incorporates the objective function f(x) and the constraint function g(x). 
There are different ways to convert (3.1)—(3.2) into (3.3), among which weighted sum 
or minmax are two popular approaches as shown in (3.4)-(3.5) with the weighting 
factors W{ > 0. 
n m 
j=i , k=1 
F(x)= max [w / (x),w^glt(x)] (3.5) 
j=Y.n,k=\'.m 
For (3.3) and (3.4), the local and global minima can be calculated if the region of 
realizability of x is convex, [74], For (3.3) and (3.5) all local and multiple global 
minima (if any) can theoretically be located, [75], For power system problems, the 
optimization problem may not always be convex, and therefore requires heuristic 
algorithms such as GAs, PSO or DE to solve it. 
Depending on the specific problem to be optimized, the weighting factor can have 
different practical meanings. For example, in risk management for power system 
planning, the weighting factor can represent the relative importance of each objective 
and constraint; it can also represent the probability of occurrence for future scenario 
while considering their impact on the planning options. 
3.2.2 Multi-objective optimisation 
An optimisation problem is normally firstly represented by a suitable mathematical 
model. In reality, many optimisation problems are multi-objective problems. Equations 
(3.1) and (3.2) represent a typical general form of minimisation problem with M 
multiple objectives. The major difference between single objective optimisation 
problem and multi-objective optimisation problem is that multi-objective optimisation 
problems, in the multi-dimensional objective space, may have three different instances, 
i.e., the objectives can be (i) totally conflicting, (ii) non-conflicting, or (iii) partially 
conflicting, [73, 76]. For totally conflicting problems, there will be no improvements 
in the optimisation process unless some constraints can be violated. This also means 
that all feasible solutions are optimal as well. For instances with non-conflicting 
objectives, the objectives will be correlated; and optimisation based on any objective 
also leads to optimal solution for other objectives. With some reformulation of the 
objective function, this type of optimisation problem can be converted into a single 
objective optimisation problem. In reality, many practical multi-objective optimisation 
problems, such as optimal bidding problems, belong to the partially conflicting 
category. For this type of multi-objective optimisation problems, a set of solutions in a 
Pareto front are of more interest than a single optimal solution. For bidding problems 
and generation risk management, selection of the optimal solution usually depends on 
the risk attitude of the decision makers. 
Throughout the research, the generation bidding and risk management models are 
formulated into multi-objective optimization problems with partially incompatible 
objectives, subject to a list of equality and inequality constraints. For example, a 
GENCO's profit maximization problem in building bidding strategies can be 
formulated as an optimisation problem as follows, 
ma (3-6) 
<=i 
where x represents the forecasted MCP at hour t in $/MWh , qt represents the power 
produced by the generator at hour t in MW and C, represents the power production 
cost at hour t in $/MW. 
The objective function (3.6) is subject to various constraints including, power flow 
conditions, generation limits, ramping constraints, minimum ON/OFF durations, and 
fuel constraints, etc. 
There are different ways to handle the multiple objectives. A simple approach is to 
combine all objectives into one by using the weighted sum method. Although this 
approach is simple in implementation, it does experience difficulties in finding the 
Pareto-optimal solution, i.e. the set of optimal solutions for all objectives. The "ideal 
point" or weighted sum metric method is another widely used option. This approach 
minimizes the distance between the practical solution and the given ideal solution. 
Another important multi-objective optimisation technique is the goal programming 
method. This method requires less computational costs and yet facilitates greater 
flexibility in handling different types of optimisation problems, including "equal to" 
and "greater and equal to" type problems. The goal programming method locates the 
solution by finding solutions that attain the predefined targets. Moreover, if the 
solutions are not achievable goal programming methods will minimise the deviation 
from targets instead. For an "equal to" type optimisation problem, goal programming 
approach can be formulated as follows, 
goal fi{x)^ti 
x es, i = l,...,M 
where S is the feasible search region, and tt is predefined target for individual 
objective to be achieved. The ideal targets of this optimisation problem can be 
obtained by estimation or by independently optimising the objectives before the multi-
objective optimisation process. More often, the multiple objectives are of quite 
different magnitudes and need to be normalised for better optimisation outcomes. 
There are two commonly used methods for normalisation for this purpose, (i) solving 
the objectives to find their minima and maxima, or (ii) multiplying proper constant 
values to the objectives to normalise them approximately within the same order of 
magnitude. Obviously, the second approach requires less computational complexity 
and is used in this research. 
To solve a specific multi-objective optimisation problem with M objectives, such as 
optimal bidding problem, deviations from each of the M objectives can be used to 
formulate the composite objective function for the weighted goal programming 
approach, [77]: 
M 
Minmize AXaigi+ 
i—\ 
Subjectto fi(x)-g{ +Ti =tt (3-8) 
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gt,Ti and / = l,. . . ,M 
where, for the z'th objective, and r, are the positive and negative deviations 
respectively, each of them is multiplied by corresponding weighting factors a, and /?,. 
The weighting factors are often of equal values in order to ensure the solution stays as 
close as possible in line with the targets in either direction. 
3.2.3 Pareto Front and Optimality 
The optimisation solution quality relays on Pareto dominance, which together with 
Pareto optimality form the basis of multi-objective optimisation [77]. There are three 
different types of Pareto dominance, (i) weak dominance, which refers to the situation 
where one objective weakly dominates another objective; (ii) strong dominance, where 
one objective strongly dominates another objective; and (iii) incomparable dominance, 
where one objective is incomparable with another objective in the objective space. 
Take a minimisation problem for example Figure 3-1 illustrates these three different 
types of Pareto dominance. Take solution s for reference, it strongly dominates the 
solutions in region (1) because 5 is better for both objectives f\ and fa. In region (2), 
however, the solution is better than s for both objectives, and therefore they strongly 
dominate solution s. Solutions along the dotted border lines of different regions are 
weakly dominated by solution s only because it is only better in one of the objectives. 
Solutions in regions (3) and (4) are incomparable to solution s because they are better 
only in one of the objectives compared with s. 
h 
Figure 3-1 Pareto dominance relationship between candidate solutions (x) 
and a particular solution (s) 
The set of dominated solutions forms the optimal Pareto front in the objective space. It 
represents the trade-off solutions known as the Pareto optimal set. As shown in Figure 
3-2, each objective component of any non-dominated solution in the Pareto optimal set 
can not be improved without degrading at lest another objective components [73, 74], 
fx 
Optimal Pareto 
fioilt 
h 
Figure 3-2 Pareto front in the objective space composed of objectives f l and f2 
For real world multi-objective optimisation problems, the optimal Pareto front and 
trade-off information is usually limited or not known a priori. In solving such 
problems, it is desirable to obtain solutions as much as possible in the Pareto optimal 
set to form an approximation set as close as possible to the true Pareto optimal set. 
Ensuring the wide distribution and diversity of the solutions in the approximation set 
also contributes to the knowledge of true Pareto optimal set. However, this is 
sometime limited by the available computing resources and depends on the 
optimisation problem itself. A compromise is often needed. 
Once the optimisation problem is properly understood and formulated, the next step is 
to use optimisation methods to solve them. In this research, EC methods are used in 
solving optimisation problems for generation bidding strategy and risk management 
problems. Some of the used algorithms are described in the sequel. 
3.3 Evolutionary Algorithms (EAs) 
Proposed over 40 years ago, EAs or EC methods refer to stochastic optimization 
algorithms developed from the natural evolution principles. GAs, EP, and 
Evolutionary Strategies (ES) are the three main streams of EA. Different from the 
traditional optimization methods, which search the solution space with a single 
candidate solution point, EAs are based on a population of tentative solutions using 
evolutionary operators to locate acceptable good solutions if not the global optima. 
The search and optimization process generates successively better results to 
approximate the global optimal solutions. The generation introduction of EAs had been 
given in Chapter 2 of this thesis. In this section, more recent algorithms of Differential 
Evolution (DE) and Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) are given in more details. 
These methods are used through out this thesis to solve different optimization 
problems and in forming frameworks of generation bidding and risk management 
schemes. 
3.3.1 Conventional EAs 
• Genetic Algorithm (GA) 
GA[78] [76] is an optimization algorithm originated from natural evolution principles. 
It is robust, adaptive and has found its application in a wide variety of theoretical and 
practical problems involving search and optimization tasks. Different from the 
traditional calculus based optimization techniques, GA is based on a population of 
encoded tentative solutions, which are processed with some evolutionary operators to 
find a good acceptable solution if not the global optimum one. The search and 
optimization process follows the principle of the survival of the fittest to generate 
successively better results over generations to finally approximate the optimal 
solutions. 
In the implementation of GA, a population of candidate solutions, which are referred 
to as chromosomes, evolves to satisfactory solutions, approximating the global 
solution in finite generations through genetic operators of reproduction, mutation and 
crossover. 
Among the many factors affecting the robustness and effectiveness of GA, population 
size and the total number of generations are among the most important ones. When the 
population size is increased more than its minimum size, the computation time for the 
evolution process may increase if the number of generations required for obtaining the 
optimal solutions cannot be reduced sufficiently. For GA, the minimum population 
size can be reduced by forming high quality chromosomes in a population. A balance 
has to be made so as to explore the search space with the minimum number of 
individuals in order to save computational costs. The program flow chart of a typical 
GA is given in Fig. 3-3, [79, 80], 
The authors of paper [45] address the problem of developing optimally coordinated 
bidding strategies for competitive generators in energy and spinning reserve markets 
which are dispatched separately to minimize customer payments. The presumption in 
this paper is that each generator bids a linear energy supply function and a linear 
spinning reserve supply function into the energy and spinning reserve markets and 
each generator decides the coefficients in the two linear supply functions to maximize 
his/her profits, subject to expectation about other competitors' bids. The problem is 
described as a stochastic optimization model and finally be solved by using GA. 
The authors in [81] present the problem of developing optimal bidding strategies for 
generators in a day-ahead energy market. Each generator decides its coefficients in the 
linear energy supply functions to maximize total benefits in the schedule day based on 
the expectations about rivals' bidding strategies. The authors propose an overall 
bidding strategy based on two bidding schemes, namely 'maximum hourly-benefit 
bidding strategies' and 'minimum stable output bidding strategies'. Stochastic 
optimization models are first developed to describe these two different bidding 
schemes. Finally, the overall bidding strategy is developed by a GA for the day-ahead 
market. 
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Figure 3-3 A typical Genetic Algorithm (GA) [76] 
• Evolutionary Programming (EP) 
In [44], the authors propose an optimal bidding strategy for a generator under a day-
ahead market. The selection of parameters for the energy market and reserve market 
when taking generating technique constraints into account is formulated as a stochastic 
optimization problem. Finally the problem is solved by using EP. 
• Evolutionary Strategy (ES) 
Paper [45] presents an evolution strategy for generator bidding in day-ahead electricity 
auction market based on the (1+1)-ES algorithm. The authors explore the influence of 
generators' types on the market average bidding price. 
• Other EC methods 
Other EC based optimisation methods have also been applied in various generation 
planning and risk management areas. Such techniques include DE, PSO, Memetic 
Algorithm (MA) and their variations, such as DE with sharing function and online PSO, 
for better performances. These optimisation techniques, together with multi-objective 
optimisation method are needed in building up the optimal bidding strategic in a 
market. They form an important part of this PhD research and are described in greater 
details in the following sections. 
3.3.2 Differential Evolution (DE) 
DE was proposed by Storn and Price in [82, 83]. It is a heuristic optimization method 
basically designed for solving complex minimization problems. Similar to the EAs, 
DE doesn't require the optimization problem to be differentiable and convex. In DE, 
the differences of randomly selected pairs of objective vectors are used to guide the 
mutation operation, whereas EAs use probability distribution functions for the 
mutation process instead. The objective functions' topography determines the 
distribution of the object vectors in the DE search process, and thus the efficiency of 
DE is generally higher than other EAs. In [76], the main advantages of a DE are 
summarized as follows, 
• DE is fast and simple for application and modification; 
• It has effective global optimization capability; 
• It has parallel processing nature; 
• A DE operates on floating point format with high precision; 
• It is an efficient algorithm without sorting or matrix multiplication; 
• DE uses self-referential mutation operation; 
• DE is effective on integer, discrete and mixed parameter optimization; 
• IT has the ability to handle non-differentiable, noisy, and/or time-dependent 
objective functions; 
• A DE operates on flat surfaces; and 
• It has the ability to provide multiple solutions in a single run and effective in 
nonlinear constraint optimization problems with penalty functions. 
Similar to other EAs DE also uses the initial population generation, mutation, 
recombination and selection operators to search the optimal solutions. The 
fundamentals of DE are reviewed below. 
(1) Initial Population Generation 
A population of ./V parameter vectors for each generation is used in DE. At generation 
G, the populationPG is composed of XjG, i= 1, 2, ...,N. The initial population PG0 can 
be chosen randomly under uniform probability distribution if there is no information 
about the optimization problem a priori. The following equation can be used to 
generate the initial population, 
x ? = V ) + rand, [0,1] • (x,(ff) - \ i (L)) (3.9) 
where x;(x) and are the lower and higher boundaries of x; = { x j j } = { x X 2 . . . , 
Xdj} . It should be noted that, if there is available information about the problem to be 
optimized, some preliminary solutions can be included to the initial population by 
adding normally distributed random deviations to the nominal solution. This will lead 
to faster convergence toward the optima. 
(2) Mutation and Recombination 
DE uses parameter vectors throughout its search process. A new parameter vector is 
formed by adding the weighted difference between two individuals with a third 
individual. The new vector is then evaluated and compared with a predetermined 
individual in search for a better individual. If the new parameter vector is better than 
the predetermined one, it will replace the predetermined parameter vector. In every 
generation, the best parameter vector is evaluated to track the progress. The search 
distance and direction information of the population is used to build the random 
deviations for DE in its search process. 
For each dimension at dimension je[ 1, d], the process of generating a child vector 
based on the distance information of parent parameter vectors can be described in the 
following equation, which is referred to as scheme DE 1 by Storn and Price in [82], 
x'=x%+F-(x°-x%) (3.10) 
where r\ * r2 * r3 * i are random integers. They are used to index the current parent 
object vector. Clearly, the population size N must be greater than 3. F e (0, 1+) is a 
real constant positive scaling factor which controls the scale of the differential 
variation (xriG - xr2°) - see Fig. 3-4. 
Figure 3-4 The child vector creation procedure with DE 1, where the closed lines are the contour 
toward the minimal solution point [76] 
The crossover constant CR e [0,1] is used to select the new vector to ensure the search 
diversity. Some of the new vectors will be used as child vectors for the following 
generation. The process of creating new candidates is described in the following 
pseudo-code 
Pseudo-code of the creation procedure in DE (mutation and recombination): 
Mutation and recombination: 
For each individual j in the population 
Generate 3 random integers, r\, rj and r3 e(l,N) 
and r&r&r&j 
Generate a random integer irand e (1,N) 
For each parameter i 
If rand{0,1) <CR or i = ira„d 
X'y = Xi,r3 + F-(X(>/ - \ i j 2) 
Else 
End If 
End For i 
End For j 
To include the impact from the best candidate vector \besiG of the current generation in 
the search process, DE2 scheme can be used. It is formulated as follows, 
x'=x?+A-(xGbesl-x?) + F-(x°l-x(;2) (3.11) 
In this scheme, the best vector of the current generation provides extra greediness for 
the search process through parameter X - see Fig 3-5. This is useful for non-critical 
objective functions. 
Figure 3-5 The child vector creation procedure with DE 2 from vectors of current generation, 
where the closed lines are the contour toward the minimal solution point [76] 
(3) The overall DE search process 
Similar to other EAs in selecting new candidate vectors, DE compares each new vector 
x' with the previous vector x,. The original vector x, is replaced by the new vector x' 
into the next generation if the new vector results into a better optimization objective. 
The overall flow chart of a typical DE is given in Figure 3-6. 
Figure 3-6 Flow Chart of A Typical DE 
(4) Main DE Operations 
DE relies on a number of operations to guide its search process. The main ones include 
encoding, mutation, cross-over, selection and population size selection. 
Encoding - Instead of binary encoding method, floating point numbers are used to 
encode the parameter variables in DE. It is also used in the DE mutation process as 
well. This is a major advantage over other conventional EAs which rely on binary 
encoding schemes, which suffer from limited capability to effectively represent 
variables of different magnitudes, and have difficulty in preserving continuum's 
topology where the scheme may not map consecutive binary integers to adjacent 
values of the original variables. Such difficulties do not exist with DE. 
Mutation - In the DE search process, mutation operation is to enable search diversity in 
the parameter space and to provide search directions leading to possibly better 
solutions. For real parameter optimization, mutation is realized by adding a randomly 
generated number with zero mean to one or more parameters of an existing vector. In 
DE search process, the mutation vectors are generated by adaptively scaling and 
correlating the output of pre-defined, multivariate probability distribution. For the G-th 
generation, DE mutation can be achieved by adding the weighted difference of two 
randomly selected vectors as follows, 
x ' ^ x f +fv(xrlG-x,2°) (3.12) 
where rl, rl e {1, 2,..., N} are randomly selected integers. rl ± r2 * i, which ensures 
that the mutation process will not become an arithmetic crossover process. For 
example, if r2w i, the mutation process will become 
x' i^1=x,G+/2-(x,iG-x !G) (3.13) 
Clearly this is just a linear combination of two vectors, and is not mutation but rather 
arithmetic crossover. It should be noted that both (3.12) and (3.13) provide useful input 
in guiding the search process, but in different ways. More complex mutation process 
can be found in [76, 84, 85]. DE mutation can be regarded as globally correlated and 
therefore increases the DE's global optimization capability. 
Crossover or recombination - crossover or recombination is only a complementary 
process for DE. It is designed to reinforce prior success in forming the next generation. 
Discrete recombination is the basic recombination method. Crossover constant CR can 
be used to determine if the newly generated individual is to be recombined. By 
combining (3.12) and (3.13), mutation and crossover process can be formed, 
5 < +fr(*r3G- x,°) + F-(xr\°- xr2°) (3.14) 
where r\ * r2 * r3 * i , and F is the mutation constant and f2 e [0,1] and remains 
constant though the evolution process. It controls the crossover constant. Clearly, f2 = 1 
is the discrete recombination model with CR = 1, and/2 ^ 0 is the mutation only model. 
Population size - both fixed and variable population size can be used in DE's search 
process. Smaller population size corresponds to fast convergence, but may be subject 
to premature convergence or stagnation. A population size of between 2 - 1 0 0 times of 
the problem dimension will usually generate satisfactory results. 
In addition to the fundamentals of DE described above, there are also other advanced 
DEs introduced in the literature. These include parallel differential algorithm,[84], and 
direction hybrid DE, [86]; DE for constrained optimization,[87]; pareto-based multi-
objective DE, [85]; variable scaling hybrid DE, [88]; and sharing function enhanced 
DE, [89], 
DE has a clear structure in its search process, and yet with very strong global search 
capability and high efficiency compared with conventional EAs. It is used in a number 
of applications in this thesis. 
3.3.3 Particle Swarm Optimisation (PSO) 
PSO is another recently developed EA. PSO was first introduced in 1995 by Kennedy 
and Eberhart in [90]. It was originated from the simulation of bird flocks behavior. 
One of the commonly used bird flock or fish school models for PSO studies is the one 
developed by [91]. In this model, birds start searching by flying around with no 
particular destination and in spontaneously formed flocks until one of the birds fly 
over the roosting area, or the good solution point within the search domain. In a PSO 
algorithm, Similar to other EAs, PSO is first initialised with a population of random 
candidate solutions. It then searches for optima by updating each generation - see 
Figure 3-7. However, different from other EAs such as GAs, PSO has no evolutionary 
operators such as crossover and mutation. Instead, each particle will fly over a solution 
space and try to find the best solution depending on its own discoveries and past 
experiences of its neighbours. 
The PSO method can be described by the following two equations, 
(3.15) 
m m I I M M I Ji ' ' 1 v b e s'- ' ' (3.16) 
where FjG is the velocity of individual i at iteration G, a>, cx and c 2 are weight 
parameters/factors, r\ and r2 are random numbers between 0 and 1, x, G is the position 
of individual i at iteration G; PbestiG is the best position of individual i until iteration k, 
and Gbesti1 is the best position of the group until iteration G. Eqn (3.15) defines the 
movement of each individual with the velocity defined in (3.16). Clearly the PSO 
method has comparable computational efficiency with DE. 
CTerminate, output gbest 
Figure 3-7 Flow Chart of A Typical PSO 
In this thesis GA, DE and PSO are used at different occasions for locating the optimal 
I 
bidding solutions. 
3.4 Conclusions 
Building optimal strategic bidding, solving portfolio selection problems and modelling 
risk management are basically an optimisation problem which requires efficient 
optimisation tools in order to locate the optimal solutions. In practice there are a 
number of available tools for such purpose, including linear programming, nonlinear 
programming, and EC based methods. In an electricity market, the GENCOs, when 
developing their bidding strategies, allocating asset to solve portfolio selection 
problems, and implementing risk management to achieve risk aims, need to consider a 
number of factors and find the optimal ones. In some cases, optimisation problems can 
be approximated by linear solvers for computational speed. However, in other cases, 
the problem may become too complex (such as non-convexity) to be tackled by linear 
solvers. In such circumstances, EC based approaches can be used. In the following 
chapters, different EAs are used in forming the optimal bidding strategies, solving 
portfolio selection problem, implementing risk management for a GENCO in an 
electricity market to maximise its profit and effectively manage its risk under different 
circumstances. 
Chapter 4 
A framework of optimal bidding strategy 
with market uncertainty 
In this chapter, a comprehensive framework of building optimal bidding strategies 
under highly uncertain market conditions is proposed. The motivation and intuition of 
the proposed framework are presented first, followed by detailed descriptions. 
Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedastic (GARCH) model and GA, 
which are incorporated in the framework, are briefly discussed for completeness. The 
results based on simulations using realistic market data are finally presented to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach. 
4.1 Introduction 
As stated in Chapter 2, many approaches are present for designing optimal bidding 
strategies. However, these methods have a number of limitations. A major problem in 
existing methods is assuming that some market information, which is unknown in 
practice, is public and available. For example, existing approaches usually assume 
rivals' cost information is publicly available, while this information is actually 
confidential. Some of the existing approaches assume that the MCP is a known factor 
for market participants, or assume that the forecasted electricity price is very accurate. 
In practice however, these assumptions are always violated because of the extreme 
volatility and uncertainties of the electricity price. The incomplete market information 
and many other uncontrollable factors cause significant uncertainties in designing 
bidding strategies. To design the optimal bidding strategies, the market uncertainties 
should be accurately estimated and taken into account in the designing procedure. 
Moreover, in such an uncertain market environment, bidding strategies depend not 
only on market rules, market variables and competitors, but also on the participant's 
attitude towards risk. A risk averse would choose to sell the electricity at a low price to 
assure it will be dispatched. A risk seeker, on the other hand, prefers high profits which 
will also cause high risk. In this research, we will develop a novel framework, which 
takes into account the market uncertainties and the risk attitude of generators in 
building optimal bidding strategies. 
4.2 The proposed Framework of Optimal Bidding Strategy 
4.2.1 Market Mechanism 
A bid includes price offers and the amount of load to be satisfied by the market for 
each hour. The mechanism of a day-ahead electricity market is as follows Firstly, each 
generator uses a self-schedule algorithm to determine its optimal self-schedule. 
Secondly, each generator applies a bidding strategy to optimize its self-schedule in 
order to get maximum profit. Thirdly, the market participants submit their bids in 
trading intervals bids to a market. These bids are composed of a set of power prices 
and power offered in intervals. Finally, the market operator determines the generation 
and load dispatch, as well as the MCP via its economic dispatch algorithm, which 
select the cheapest available resource. The supplier that sets up the MCP is the most 
expensive one, and other suppliers are all paid at this price which is above their bids. 
Please note this mechanism is based on System Marginal Price fSMP) Auction, more 
details can be found in Chapter 2. 
Generators' behaviour depends on several elements such as daily forecast demand and 
price, system availability, the predicted generation reserve, transfer between the 
regions, contract position and its degree of risk aversion under price uncertainties. 
4.2.2 Self-scheduling 
In self-scheduling, the profit maximization problem can be formulated as follows: 
ma - c J (4.1) 
r=i 
Subject to: Ramp-up rate limits 
Ramp-down rate limits 
Start-up ramp rate limits 
Shut-down ramp rate limit 
where Xti represents the forecasted MCP at hour t and scenario i in $/MWh and qH 
the power produced by the generator at hour t and scenario i in MW. 
For simplicity, in the experiment, variable production cost Cti will be used as the 
generator's operation cost neglecting the fixed, shut-down, and start-up cost in the 
function. These variables can be implemented in a similar way if needed. This 
objective function will be used to optimize a generator's bids with the forecast price as 
the Atj variable and then an optimization algorithm will be applied to solve this self-
scheduling problem and get the optimal production of electricity. 
4.2.3 Major Steps of the Proposed Framework 
As discussed before, a major objective of our framework is to estimate and handle the 
uncertainties. To accomplish this goal, advanced data mining and statistical techniques 
will be integrated in the framework - see Fig 4-1. The major steps of the framework 
are as follows: 
(1) Employing load and price forecasting techniques to forecast the future loads 
and prices 
It is essential to accurately forecast the future loads and prices so that the generator can 
assure it will be dispatched. In the proposed framework, traditional time series 
methods (e.g. Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA)), machine 
learning techniques (Neural Networks or SVM) or Game Theory methods can be 
selected to estimate the future loads and prices. Comprehensive experiments had been 
conducted to determine which technique is superior in load and price forecasting. 
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Figure 4-1 The Proposed Bidding Strategy Framework 
(2) Employing data mining and statistical methods to quantify the market 
uncertainties 
Significant uncertainties present in designing bidding strategies. The uncertainties 
come from many sources, such as the price volatility and the uncertainties of rivals' 
behaviours. A GARCH model and associated statistical methods will be developed to 
quantify the uncertainties so that based on the estimated uncertainties we can build 
different strategies according to the risk attitudes of generators. 
(3) Building bidding scenarios 
Several different bidding scenarios are constructed in this step. Each scenario has a 
bidding price derived from the estimated uncertainties and the risk level of the 
generator. 
(4) Self-scheduling in optimizer 
EC based optimization technique will be employed to solve the optimization problem 
in (4.1). 
(5) Generating bidding curves for each bidding scenarios 
After the optimal production for each scenario is obtained in step (4), the bidding 
curve for each scenario can finally be generated. Each bidding curve is designed 
specifically for a generator with a certain risk level. 
The basic procedure of the proposed framework is shown in Fig. 4-1. Several 
experiments will be implemented to validate the effectiveness of the proposed 
framework, as is discussed in following sections in this chapter. 
4.3 GARCH Models 
In the proposed method, GARCH models are employed for accurate price forecasting, 
and estimating the uncertainties of prices. In this section, the fundamentals of GARCH 
models are firstly introduced. Afterwards, applying GARCH models to forecasting the 
conditional mean and variance of MCP is discussed; followed by the discussion on 
constructing several price scenarios with the outputs of GARCH models. 
4.3.1 The Fundamentals of GARCH Methodology 
In the traditional Box-Jenkins approach to time series analysis, time series models are 
usually assumed to follow these conditions [92]: 
m 1 
Y, =C + X 1 * 1 + (4.2) 
1=1 X=1 
e,~N(0,cr2) (4.3) 
E(£,£T) = 0 for t * T , (4.4) 
where e, is Gaussian white noise [92] and uncorrected across time. This model is 
known as the ARM A (m,l) (Autoregressive Moving Average) model. It assumes that 
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the current observation of a time series is determined by the previous observations and 
Gaussian disturbances. Sometimes, Y, may also be related to some explanatory 
variables. The ARMA model is then naturally generalized to the ARMAX model, 
which takes the form: 
m I k 
Yt = C J g J j ^ + + (4-5) 
i I 1=1 
where Xi represents the explanatory variable. Assuming the above models, the 
conditional distribution of Yt can be shown to follow a Normal distribution [92]: 
m I k 
~ (4.6) 
i = l i = l i = l 
The optimal forecast of Yt is: 
m I k 
Y , = E(X\t-d =c + £ fiY.-i + X di£t-i + Z J K (4-7) 
1=1 !=1 !=1 
which theoretically leads to the minimum MSE (mean square error). The forecast (4.7) 
is therefore also referred to as the minimum MSE forecast. 
The validity of the Box-Jenkins approach is strictly proven. Unfortunately, its 
assumption of constant variance is often violated in practice. In real-world applications, 
the variance of st is usually time-changing or correlated with explanatory variables. 
Modelling the time-changing variance is essential in handling the time series with 
large volatility. An accurate estimate of the conditional variance can significantly 
improve the forecasting accuracy. Moreover, it is also useful for estimating the risk of 
forecasting, which will be discussed in the following sections. GARCH models are 
therefore introduced to solve this problem. It is usually expressed as [92]: 
Y \ t _ , ~ N { X , B ^ ) ( 4 . 8 ) 
h, = ctf - a0 + £ ( 4 - 9 ) 
;=i i=i 
s , - Y t - XtB (4.10) 
X , = ( l , Yt_v..,e,_v.., X r . . ) (4.11) 
B ' = ( c , 0 r . . , 0 r . . , y r . . ) (4.12) 
Note that (4.8) is actually the same as (4.7). Therefore, model (4.8)-(4.12) can be 
viewed as an ARMAX model with the GARCH disturbance. It still uses the ARMAX 
model-to estimate the conditional mean of Yt, but introduces Equation (4.10) to handle 
the conditional variance. The model (4.8)-(4.12) is called an ARMAX (m,l,k) + 
GARCH (p,q) model. Note that the GARCH (p,q) model is a generalization of the 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscadasticity (ARCH) model. If we set p = 0, the 
model will actually become the ARCH (q) model as introduced in [92]. 
Building a GARCH forecasting model usually includes the following steps: 
(1) Test the GARCH effect with the Lagrange multiplier test to determine whether 
GARCH models are applicable; 
(2) Identify a GARCH model with a proper form according to data; 
(3) Estimate the parameters of the GARCH model; 
(4) Validate model effectiveness. If the model is satisfactory, continue to step (5), 
otherwise, go back to step (2); 
(5) Apply the GARCH model to forecast the test time series data. 
4.3.2 Forecasting with GARCH Models 
After a proper GARCH model is identified, it then can be used on the out-of-sample 
data to forecast the electricity price. The procedure of GARCH forecasting is 
illustrated in Figure 4-2. Different from ARIMA or machine learning techniques, a 
GARCH model can be used to forecast both the mean and variance of a time series. 
Given a sample of a time series yi,y2,...y,_1 and its explanatory variables Xi,X2,...X,_l, V 
the optimal forecast of ' given by the GARCH model is the same as that of ARMAX, 
m I k 
% + ! > , - , t J j i X , • (4.13) 
i=1 1=1 i=l 
In GARCH forecasting, this is called conditional mean forecasting [93], because it 
employs the conditional mean of Yt as its forecast. Similar to ARMAX, (4.13) is still a 
minimum MSE forecast. Although the conditional mean forecast of GARCH has the 
same form as ARMAX, it can significantly outperform ARMAX because the 
conditional variance equation (4.13) is introduced. 
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Figure 4-2 The Procedure of GARCH Forecasting 
Besides enhancing the forecasting of Yt, another major application of GARCH model 
is to perform conditional variance forecasting. According to [94], we have: 
Var(Yt | r—i) — E( s? 11~\) • (4-14) 
The Minimum Square Error (MSE) forecasting of the conditional variance of Yt is 
therefore given as, 
=a0 + fjaie,_i+fj/3ihl_i. (4.15) 
;=i ;=i 
The forecast of the conditional variance is essential for estimating the risk of 
forecasting. To control the forecasting risk, the standard statistical approach is to give 
the prediction interval [92, 95]. Generally speaking, an a level prediction interval of 
Yt is a stochastic interval[L t ,U t], which satisfies; 
P(Ylz[L„U,]) = \-a. (4.16) 
The implication of (4.16) is that Y, will fall in [L,,Ut] with a probability of I-a . 
With the prediction interval, the decision makers can conveniently control the decision 
risk by setting a proper a . GARCH models employ both the conditional mean forecast 
and conditional variance forecast to calculate the prediction interval, the detailed 
discussion about calculating the prediction interval with GARCH can be found in [92], 
4.3.3 Constructing Price Scenarios 
To consider the different preference of the risk averse and risk seeker, a possible 
solution is to construct several price scenarios. Several prices above and below the 
forecasted price will be calculated and the corresponding optimal production is 
obtained. The risk averse will choose one or several scenarios with the prices lower 
than the forecasted price. The risk seeker, on the other hand, will choose the scenarios 
with higher prices. 
To construct price scenarios for a time t, the conditional mean forecast and conditional 
variance forecast given by the GARCH model is essential. For each price scenario, an 
upper-sided prediction interval is obtained. The upper-sided prediction interval is 
defined as: 
P(Y, e[-oo,U,]) = a (4.17) 
Here U, will be the bidding price for the scenario with confidence level a , and is 
calculated as: 
U, =Y,+zl_ax&l, (4.18) 
where zx_a is the upper lH« critical point [93] of the standard normal distribution. 
Note that in (4.17), a represents the probability that the real price is lower than U,; 
a therefore is an indicator of the risk of a scenario. A smaller a implies that the 
generator is more likely to be dispatched, and vice versa. The risk seeker would choose 
the scenarios with higher prices and greater a . The risk averse would prefer the 
smaller a and lower profits. For each scenario, a is useful for calculating the expected 
profit, which has considered the risk of prices. GA is used to find the optimal solution 
to this problem. 
4.4 Case Studies 
In this section, an empirical study is conducted to analyse the profit obtained with the 
proposed bidding strategy technique. The aim of this case study is to demonstrate how 
the bidding strategies can optimise the generator's profit. 
It is assumed that a 294-MW coal-fired generator is located in the Australian NEM and 
is selected in these case studies. The individual operating constrains of the generator 
are based on the data of [96] Table 4-1 shows the individual operating constrains of the 
thermal plant. 
Table 4-1 Operating Constraints of the Generator 
Minimum power output [MW] 112 
Maximum capacity[MW] 294 
Start-up ramp rate limit[MW/h] 170 
Shut-down ramp rate limit[MW/h] 160 
Ramp-up rate limit[MW/h] 60 
Ramp-down rate limit[MW/h] 50 
The variable cost used in this chapter is linearized into 10 blocks and the slopes of 
each block are presented in Figure 4-3. 
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Figure 4-3 Piecewise Linear Variable Cost 
The production of 170MW is taken as the initial state in self-scheduling. It is assumed 
that the system has been running in this production level for 11 hours. It is also 
assumed that the generator's production remains the same within each hour. 
4.4.1 Self-scheduling 
The self-scheduling could be performed by optimizing the objective function (4.1). 
Then the generator's optimal production can be calculated for the nine price scenarios 
with different confidence levels. The optimal production for bidding at the forecasted 
MCP is shown in Fig. 4-4. 
Figure 4-4 Optimal production of the generator for bidding at the Forecasted price 
In hour 1 (/=1), the MCP is smaller than the variable cost and the generator's profit is 
negative. However, due to the shut-down ramp rate limit, the unit cannot be shut-down. 
Because the minimum/maximum down time is neglected in this study, after this 
interval, the generator could be off when the MCP is lower than its marginal cost slope. 
It should be noted that from hour 11 (t =11), the variable cost is lower than the MCP 
($41.27/WMh versus 54.53/WMh), but the generator cannot increase its production 
immediately to 294MW because of the technique constraints (Ramp-up rate limit). It 
should also be mentioned that there is a price spike in hour 13 (f=13), the generator 
increases its production to the maximum capacity (294MW) to get the maximum profit. 
4.4.2 Scenarios analysis 
Based on the real price data of the Australia NEM on 13 Jan, 2005, the price scenarios 
and optimal production obtained from the self-scheduling are shown in Tables 4-2 and 
4-3. 
Table 4-2 Price Scenarios for the Case Study 
Price[$/MWh] 
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1 19.4 12.1 15.1 16.9 18.2 20.6 22 23.8 26.8 
2 17.6 11 13.7 15.4 16.6 18.7 19.9 21.5 24.3 
3 17.3 11.4 13.8 15.3 16.4 18.3 19.4 20.8 23.3 
4 20.5 14 16.7 18.3 19.5 21.6 22.8 24.4 27.1 
5 11.7 3.1 6.6 8.7 10.3 13.1 14.7 16.8 20.4 
6 22.2 15.2 18.1 19.8 21.1 23.4 24.7 26.4 29.3 
7 26.9 19.9 22.8 24.5 25.8 28.1 29.3 31 33.9 
8 36.9 23.7 29.2 32.4 34.8 39.1 41.5 44.7 50.2 
9 40.8 23.8 30.8 34.9 38 43.5 46.6 50.7 57.7 
10 32.9 19.2 24.9 28.2 30.7 35.2 37.7 41 46.7 
11 54.5 27.5 38.7 45.2 50.1 58.9 63.8 70.4 81.5 
12 58 25.3 38.8 46.8 52.7 63.4 69.3 77.3 90.8 
13 106 32.8 63 80.8 94.1 117.9 131.1 148.9 179.1 
14 80.1 13.8 41.2 57.3 69.3 90.9 102.9 119 146.4 
15 35 3.4 5.4 17.6 26.8 43.2 52.3 64.5 85.3 
16 33 5.1 10.7 19.9 26.8 39.2 46.1 55.3 71.1 
17 34.5 5.7 17.6 24.5 29.8 39.1 44.4 51.4 63.3 
18 36.4 13.8 23.2 28.6 32.7 40.1 44.2 49.7 59 
19 25.8 8.6 15.7 19.9 23 28.6 31.8 35.9 43.1 
20 34.6 18.9 25.4 29.2 32.1 37.2 40.1 43.9 50.4 
21 18.3 4.9 10.5 13.7 16.1 20.5 22.9 26.2 31.7 
22 22.5 12.1 16.4 18.9 20.8 24.2 26 28.6 32.8 
23 17.7 9.6 12.9 14.9 16.4 19 20.5 22.5 25.8 
24 20.8 16.6 18.3 19.3 20.1 21.4 22.2 23.2 25 
Table 4-3 Optimal Production of Self-Schedule 
Optimal Production [MWj 
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1 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 130 0 
5 0 0 130 0 0 0 0 130 0 
6 0 0 130 130 130 0 130 130 130 
7 0 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 184 
8 130 130 130 148 148 166 184 184 238 
9 184 130 130 148 184 184 184 238 238 
10 202 130 130 130 202 148 184 184 256 
11 238 130 166 184 238 184 238 238 294 
12 256 130 166 238 238 238 238 294 294 
13 294 148 238 238 294 294 294 294 294 
14 294 184 202 238 238 294 294 294 294 
15 238 166 256 130 184 256 294 294 294 
16 238 130 202 130 130 220 294 294 294 
17 238 130 166 130 130 184 294 294 294 
18 220 130 130 130 148 148 294 294 294 
19 160 130 130 0 130 130 294 294 294 
20 148 130 130 0 148 148 294 294 294 
21 130 130 0 0 130 130 274 294 294 
22 130 0 0 0 130 130 274 294 294 
23 0 0 0 0 130 130 238 294 294 
24 0 0 0 0 0 0 202 294 294 
In order to show how generator's degree of risk aversion affects its profit, the optimal 
production and forecasted price for different confidence levels are employed to 
constitute the optimal bidding curves respectively for risk taker and risk aversion. In 
order to get the maximum profit, a risk taker usually bids at a price greater than the 
forecasted price. In other words, it usually chooses the scenarios with the confidence 
level a from 62.5% to 97.5%. On the contrary, a risk averse will offer at a price which 
is lower than the forecasted price and the confidence levels will be from 2.5% to 
37.5%. 
Four hours in twenty four intervals were selected to show the bidding curves of the 
risk taker and risk averse. Table 4-4 illustrates the scenarios for a risk taker and Table 
4-5 shows the scenarios for a risk averse. 
Table 4-4 Scenarios for a Risk Taker in Four Table 4-5 Scenarios for a Risk Averse in Four 
Intervals Intervals 
Hour 
Scenarios 
(%) 
Price 
[$/MWh] 
Production 
[MW| 
7 
62.5 28.05 130 
75 29.32 130 
87.5 31.02 130 
97.5 33.9 184 
12 
62.5 63.36 238 
75 69.31 238 
87.5 77.26 294 
97.5 90.78 294 
16 
62.5 39.19 220 
75 46.1 294 
87.5 55.34 294 
97.5 71.06 294 
21 
62.5 20.5 130 
75 22.93 274 
87.5 26.18 294 
97.5 31.71 294 
Hour 
Scenarios 
(%) 
Price 
[$/MWh] 
Production 
[MW] 
7 
2.5 19.93 130 
12.5 22.82 130 
25 24.51 130 
37.5 25.78 130 
12 
2.5 25.29 130 
12.5 38.82 166 
25 46.77 238 
37.5 52.71 238 
16 
2.5 5.06 130 
12.5 10.66 202 
25 19.9 130 
37.5 26.81 130 
21 
2.5 4.94 130 
12.5 10.47 0 
25 13.72 0 
37.5 16.15 130 
According to the market clearing mechanism, the generator's bidding prices are 
compared with real MCP to determine the final market dispatching. Only the blocks in 
which the bidding prices are lower than the real MCP will be dispatched. On the 
contrary, the generator will lose the opportunity to be dispatched if its prices are 
greater than the real MCP. Therefore, if the bidding strategies are based on the forecast 
MCP, the accuracy of the forecasting price can significantly influence the generator's 
profit. This is also the reason for applying GARCH models in the proposed 
methodology. Moreover, it has been proved that this method is effective in increasing 
the accuracy of price forecasting. 
The real price in our case study is shown in Fig.4-5. 
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Figure 4-5 Real MCP for 13 Jan, 2005 
The profit in each interval can be calculated by using equation (4.1) according to the 
real MCP after the real dispatch. The consequent profit for the risk taker and risk 
averse, which bid the constructed bidding curves based on different scenarios, are 
$11,296 and $21,318 respectively. Obviously, by taking the proposed bidding strategy, 
a risk averse can get more profits. As mentioned above, if the generator shows no 
preference for risk taking or reversion then the profit is based on the offers bidding at 
the forecasted MCP. 
Notice that because the thermal unit in this case study has technical constraints; in 
order to make profits from price spikes, they will lose some profit in the intervals 
before spikes, especially when the price is fluctuating. 
Another interesting result found in this study is that whether to take risk is sometimes 
decided by the market share of the generator. In a fully competitive market, 
participants intend to bid at their marginal costs. Unfortunately, the electricity market 
is more like an oligopoly market in which only a few generators participate in 
competition. Some participants will act as price-setters in the market competition, 
while other smaller generators will act as price takers. For the price-setter therefore, it 
will be more feasible for them to take the risk to make more profits since they could 
bid at a high price and still be dispatched. On the contrary, a price-taker should choose 
to avoid the risk, because if it bids a high price which is higher than the real MCP, it 
will probably lose the opportunity to be dispatched and finally decrease its profit. 
4.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, a novel framework is proposed, which can be used to build optimal 
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bidding strategies under highly uncertain market conditions. A variety of forecasting, 
data analysis and optimization techniques can be incorporated into this framework to 
effectively design bidding strategies given extreme market uncertainties. GARCH 
models are combined with the GA optimizer to propose a novel bidding strategy 
approach based on the generator's degree of risk. GARCH models are employed to 
give more accurate estimations of price forecasting errors and corresponding 
confidence information, compared with traditional forecasting models. GA optimizer 
is applied to maximize the GENCO's profit during its self-schedule. Finally, bidding 
curves are generated according to the generator's degree of risk aversion. With the 
proposed approach, once forecasted prices are available, the generator's self-
scheduling problem can be formulated without the further consideration of other 
competitors, i.e. the optimal bidding curves can be obtained independently of the 
problems of other rivals. Simulations are conducted based on real market prices. 
Detailed discussion is given to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method. 
It is worth noting that the proposed approach depends on forecast prices using current 
historical prices to help the decision making process. Given the complexity of the 
market prices, in order to properly accounting for the impact of forecast prices on 
current prices, the forecast modules need to be continuously updated through a number 
of means such as back casting. 
In view of market conditions, in addition to uncertainties in the market, incomplete 
information from market participants is another key feature and result of deregulation. 
Often, generators will have to build their bidding strategies based on incomplete 
market information. The capability of handling such incomplete information whilst 
achieving the best outcome is a challenging task for generators in the volatile market. 
In the following chapter, further enhancement of this framework will be presented. The 
new features and functionalities enable the framework to be used with confidence to 
generate optimal bidding strategies in a market with incomplete information. 
Chapter 5 
Developing Generators' Strategic Bidding 
in an Electricity Market Adding Rival 
Generators' Information Estimation 
In the previous chapters, fundamentals of generator bidding and a general framework 
of bidding strategy modelling have been presented. The proposed general framework 
addressed a common problem in an electricity market, i.e. uncertainty. Techniques are 
also presented to handle such uncertainties effectively. In this chapter, the research is 
advanced by new methodologies to add rival generators incomplete information in a 
market in order to form bidding strategies for a generator. This is achieved by Support 
Vector Machine (SVM) and DE based approach as to be detailed in the sequel. 
5.1 Introduction 
In this section, the problem of bidding decision-making is studied from the viewpoint 
of a GENCO. A non-linear relationship between generators' bidding productions and 
MCP is estimated. A new method is proposed in this section to add rival generators 
incomplete information to build optimal bidding strategies. This method is based on 
SVM [97] with a DE bidding strategy optimizer and Monte Carlo simulation technique. 
SVM is an advanced technique that has attracted extensive research in data mining and 
has been successfully applied in electricity price forecasting [98]. It has been proven to 
be effective in estimating the non-linear functional relationship, hence is employed in 
the proposed method to estimate the relationship between MCP and generators' bid 
productions. 
It is assumed that the bidding production of a generator in each dispatch interval 
follows a normal distribution. The parameters of these normal distributions can be 
estimated from historical bidding data. After having obtained the probability density 
function (PDF) and its parameters (mean and standard deviation), SVM is employed to 
estimate the non-linear relationship between bidding productions and MCP from 
publicly available historical market data. To deal with the problem of inherent 
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stochastic structures, the Monte Carlo simulation is applied to acquire approximate 
solutions by performing statistical sampling experiments. In each iteration of the 
Monte Carlo simulation, the outcomes of SVM are used in a bidding strategy optimizer 
based on DE to maximize GENCO's profit during its self-schedule and then provide 
the optimal strategies comprising price-production pairs. By estimating the price 
distribution from historical price data, the proposed method is able to construct a series 
of price scenarios according to generators' different attitudes to risk. The proposed 
method is therefore useful for both the risk averse and risk taker. 
The main contributions of this methodology are as follows: 
• Prediction of Rivals' Behaviours 
By employing an advanced data mining technique, rivals' behaviours can be accurately 
predicted based on publicly available market data. This method therefore effectively 
solves the incomplete information problem commonly existing in an electricity market. 
• Handling Uncertainties 
The Monte Carlo simulation and statistical estimation techniques are used to reliably 
handle the uncertainties involved in designing the optimal bidding strategy. 
5.2 Problem Formulation 
In the proposed bidding strategy model, suppose that there are n independent 
generators and a group of loads. Each generator submits its bid of a price and 
production pair in each trading interval to ISO. A non-linear relationship is assumed 
between the generators' bidding productions and the MCP. It is also assumed that in 
each trading interval, the production of each generator obeys the normal distribution. 
The mean value and standard deviation ati can be estimated from historical bidding 
data. For each generator, there are technical constraints of output Pimin and Pimax, 1 </<«. 
The estimated MCP X, at trading interval t in $/MWh can be calculated by: 
l=f{Pn,P,2>->P»] M*rT C5-1J 
where ptt ~ N{uti, • • •, <x„2) is the bidding productions of generator i at trading interval t 
in MW, T is the number of trading intervals in a day. In NEM, there are 288 trading 
intervals in a trading day. T is therefore set as 288 in this chapter. Xt is estimated by 
SVM, which will be discussed in more detail in the next section. 
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The profit maximization problem can be formulated as follows: 
T 
maximize £ a{l,g - C, {p,)] 
1=1 
subject to A, = jUx{t)+ z ] a c r A ( t ) 
+ + (5.2) 
- RDv(t - 1 ) - SDz(t) < p , ~ < RUv(M\)+ SUy{t) 
y { t ) - z ( t ) = v ( t ) - v { t - 1 ) 
y { t ) + z ( t ) < \ 
z(/)e{0,1} 
where a is the confidence level decided by the generator to adjust the MCP to take into 
account the risk attitude of the generator, C a (/> t f) is the cost of the z'th generator to 
generate pd amount of power at time t, px{t) is the mean of MCP at time t, ax{t) is the 
variance of historical price data, zx_a is the one-sided 1 - a critical value of the standard 
normal distribution, P i r r i n and fej are the minimum and maximum power output of 
generator i in MW, y(t), z(t), v(t) are the running, start-up and shut-down status 
changes, and SD, SU, SD and RD are shut-down ramp, start-up ramp, ramp-down, and 
ramp-up rate limit in MW/h. A, is the price at time t, / u x { t ) is the mean value of the 
price and z(t) is real number in between 0 and 1. 
Based on the assumption that MCP is normally distributed (this can be seen from the 
price distribution from the Australian NEM data), it can be guaranteed that the real 
MCP will be greater than A, with a probability of a. Therefore, bidding at A, will have 
a probability of a to be dispatched. Generators can determine their risks by selecting 
different a. a >0.5 represents a risk averse; otherwise the generator is a risk taker. 
In the optimization, the variable production cost will be used as the generator's 
operational cost, but for simplicity, fixed, shut-down, and start-up costs in the cost 
function are not considered at this stage. It should be noted that these parameters can 
be included easily similar to that of the operational cost. This objective function will 
be used in the chapter to optimize generator's bids with the MCP obtained from SVM 
as the At variable and then DE will be applied as the optimiser for solving the self-
scheduling problem and obtain the optimal electricity production. 
5.3 Proposed Methodologies 
5.3.1 Outline of the Proposed Method 
In this section, a detailed description is given to the proposed method. As discussed in 
the preceding section, it is essential to estimate the function/•) and parameters /uti and 
oti before the optimization can be performed. These estimates can be obtained with 
SVM and standard statistical methods. After that, the Monte Carlo simulation is 
conducted. In each iteration of the Monte Carlo simulation, rival generators' 
productions pti at time t are randomly generated with the estimated density 
distributions. These productions can then be employed by SVM to give the predicted 
MCP at time t. DE is used to solve the optimization problem and obtain the optimal 
production at time t. 
Given a training production data pdH which is the production of generator i at time t, 
day d. D is the total number of days of the training data. The production distribution 
parameters of generator i can then be estimated as: 
The second step of the proposed method is estimating /(•) with SVM. For each time 
point t, both the historical MCP kt and all generators' productions pt, are available. In 
SVM training, pti are predictor variables (inputs), and Xt is selected as the response 
variable (output). The relationship between Xt and pti can be accurately estimated 
because SVM can approximate any nonlinear functional relationship. 
After estimating J[-), [in, and ati, the Monte Carlo simulation and DE can be employed 
to solve the problem of designing the optimal bidding strategies. The Monte Carlo 
simulation is applied to obtain the optimal bids by performing random experiments. In 
each iteration of the Monte Carlo simulation, the outcomes of SVM are used in a DE 
based bidding strategy optimizer to maximize the GENCO's profit during its self-
schedule and then provide the optimal strategies. By estimating the price distribution 
from historical price data, the proposed method is able to construct a series of price 
scenarios according to generators' different attitudes to risks. The proposed method is 
therefore useful for both the risk aversion and risk taker. More details about the Monte 
(5.3) 
(5.4) 
Carlo method and DE are given in the following sections. 
The flowchart of the proposed bidding strategy method is illustrated in Figure 5-1. 
Figure 5-1 Flow Chart of the Proposed Bidding Strategy Method 
5.3.2 Support Vector Machine (SVM) 
SVM will be used as an estimating model in the experiments. A brief introduction to 
SVM is given for completeness. 
SVM is a machine learning method proposed by Vladimir Vapnik et al. at Bell 
Laboratories [99]. This method received increasing attention in recent years because of 
its excellent performance in both classification and regression. Generally, the SVM 
method is based on Vapnik's work on statistical learning theory [99]. Unlike previous 
regression methods such as regression tree or neural networks which minimize the 
empirical risk for the learning machine so as to achieve high forecasting accuracy, 
SVM tries to achieve a balance between the empirical risk and the learning capacity of 
the learning machine. This idea leads to the principle of structural risk minimization, 
which is the basis of SVM. 
The simplest form of SVM is the maximal margin classifier. It is used to solve the 
simplest problem, the regression case with linear training data. Consider the training 
data {{X\,y\), ..., (Xj, yi)}aR"xR, it is assumed that they are linear. It means that there 
exists a hyperplane <W, X> + b = 0 on which yi<W, X,> + b)>0 where <WX> is the 
dot product between Wand X. 
Margin is defined as the distance from the hyperplane to the nearest point. The aim of 
maximal margin classifier is to find the hyperplane with the largest margin, named as 
maximal hyperplane. Without loss of generality, we assume that the two points with 
label +1 and -1, which are nearest to the hyperplane, X\ and Xj. Note that the rescaling 
of W and b will not really change the hyperplane, so we have: 
BwB1 (5-1) 
(W,X2) + b = -l 
The maximal margin can be calculated as: 
r = ((W,Xl) + b- (W,X2)-b)l\W\ = 2/\W\ * (5.1) 
Therefore, the maximal margin classifier problem can be written in the following form: 
minimize / 2 subject to y,((W,X) + b)> 1 1 < / < / 
The Lagrange multipliers method can be used to solve this optimization problem of 
(5.3). 
In most real-world problems, the training data are not linearly separable. There are two 
methods to modify linear SVM to suit the non-linear case. The first is to introduce 
some slack variables to tolerate some training errors to decrease the influence of the 
noise in the training data. Another method to deal with non-linear data is to use a map 
function &(X)\ R" —>// to map the training data from input space into some high 
dimensional feature space, so that they will become linearly separable in the feature 
space. Then SVM can be applied in the feature space. Note that the training data used 
in SVM are only in the form of dot product, therefore, after the mapping the SVM 
algorithm will only depend on the dot product of <P(X). If we can find a function that 
can be written in the form of K(XU X2) = «I>(Xi), <D(X2)>, the mapping function <D{X) 
will not need to be explicitly calculated in the algorithm. K(Xi, X2) is a kernel function 
or kernel. 
Radial basis kernel is used in this chapter: 
K{X,Y) = e (5.3) 
5.3.3 Monte Carlo Simulation to Obtain the Optimal Bidding Strategies 
Monte Carlo simulation solves the stochastic optimization problem by performing 
statistical sampling experiments [97]. Before the Monte Carlo simulation, rival 
generators' bidding productions are assumed to follow normal distributions. In each 
iteration of the Monte Carlo simulation, rivals' bidding productions are randomly 
generated based on the estimated distribution. Considering the random productions as 
fixed numbers, building the optimal bidding strategy for the z'th generator becomes a 
one-parameter search problem for which the bids from the other suppliers are fixed 
through the random sampling procedure. DE can then be applied to solve the 
deterministic optimization problem and obtain a bidding strategy. After a number of 
iterations, the mean values of bidding production and price, which are obtained at each 
iteration, will be selected as the optimal bid. 
5.4 Case study 
5.4.1 Problem Description 
A detailed case study is performed based on a power system consisting of eleven 
thermal units with quadratic production costs and generation technical limits. There are 
three major objectives for this case study. 
(1) To validate whether the proposed method can properly estimate rival 
generators' productions; 
(2) In the experiments, the MCPs are obtained with SVM based on the random 
samples of estimated bidding production distribution. The profits obtained 
using the proposed method is compared with the real profits of each generator 
obtained from real market data, to demonstrate the effectiveness of the 
proposed method. 
(3) The bidding results according to different risk levels a are presented and 
evaluate how the risk levels, which depends on the risk attitude of generators, 
will influence the bidding strategies are studied. 
Till now, the NEM has been operating reliably and efficiently for over 10 years since 
December 1998. The Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) administrates and 
operates a competitive wholesale electricity market where supplies more than $10 
billion electricity annually to meet the demand of more than 8 million end users. NEM 
is thus a good choice to be chosen for case studies. The case study is conducted based 
on the real market bidding production data of the Australian NEM from September 17 
to October 16, 2006. Historical bidding data of the NEM are publicly available in the 
following trading day and are rather extensive, including all bids submitted, the unit 
that submitted the bid and the economic entity that controls the unit. 
Eleven major generators located in the NEM are selected in the case study. Their 
capacities and technical constraints can be found in [15]. It is assumed in the case 
study that one of the 11 generators designs its bidding strategy with the proposed 
method, while other generators' bidding strategies are identical to the real bidding data. 
5.4.2 Result Analysis 
Figures 5-2 ~ 5-4 show the generators' real bidding productions and the estimated 
bidding productions obtained with the proposed method. From Figures 5-2 - 5-4, it is 
evident that the proposed method can accurately estimate rival generators' behaviours. 
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To analyse the profit obtained with the proposed bidding strategy technique, an 
empirical case study is conducted to compare the difference between the real profits 
and the profits obtained with the proposed method. The results of this study can be 
used to demonstrate how the bidding strategies can optimise the generator's profit. 
The case study consists of 11 rounds. In each round, generator i, 1 < z' < 11, is assumed 
to design its bidding strategies with the proposed method, while other generators 
follow their actual bidding strategies. For each generator using the proposed method, 
its profit achieved in the experiment is compared with its real profit calculated from 
historical data. The results are shown in Fig. 5-5. 
130% 
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Figure 5-5 Real Profits vs Simulated Profits of 11 Generators 
As clearly illustrated in Fig. 5-5, the profits obtained with our method are similar to the 
real profits for generators Gl, G2 and G5. However, the proposed method results in 
significantly greater profits than the actual profits for all the other 8 generators. 
Moreover, the proposed method can increase the profit by at least 10% for these 8 
generators, and raise the profit of G6 by 120%. The results prove that the proposed 
method is highly effective in most occasions. 
To further investigate the performance of the proposed method, the historical 
productions of all 11 generators are checked. According to the historical productions, 
Gl, G2 and G5 are basically base-load generators. Their productions are very close to 
their maximum capacities at most occasions. The proposed method cannot further 
increase their productions and therefore cannot significantly improve the profits. On 
the other hand, other 8 generators' productions are usually far from their maximum 
capacities. The proposed method can thus perform well. 
As discussed in Section 2, the proposed method is applicable to both risk averse and 
risk taker, by selecting suitable confidence level a. To study the influence of a on the 
profit, the profits of generator G1 as obtained with the proposed method with respect 
to different a are plotted in Fig. 5-6. Clearly, the profit is increased when a is 
decreased from 90% to 70%. A large a indicates that the generator tends to bid at a low 
price to make sure it will be dispatched. However, bidding at a low price may decrease 
the MCP and thus decrease the generator's own profit, especially for a generator with 
relatively large market share. On the contrary, when a decreases from 70% to 10%, the 
profit significantly decreases. 
This phenomenon implies that, although a small a can increase the bidding price, the 
risk of not being dispatched is also significantly increased. The profit therefore drops 
dramatically. In summary, a neutral risk level should be usually set for obtaining the 
optimal profit. Choosing an a which is either too large or too small, can degrade the 
performance of the proposed method. 
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Figure 5-6 Profits of Generator G1 by Setting Different Confidence Level 
The bidding prices and productions for generator Gl, in four time intervals, are listed 
in Table 5-1. Notice that the thermal unit in the case study has technical constraints. In 
order to make profits from high price intervals, they will lose some profit in the 
intervals before the high price, especially when the price is fluctuating. 
Time—* 6a im 10am 4pm 8pm 
Confidenc 
e (%)i 
Price 
($/MWh) 
Productio 
n (MW) 
Price 
($/MWh) 
Productio 
n (MW) 
Price 
($/MWh) 
Productio 
n (MW) 
Price 
($/MWh) 
Productio 
n (MW) 
10 25.33 263 39.67 420 36.68 420 22.57 420 
20 24.45 186 39.14 420 36.35 420 19.97 420 
30 23.81 186 38.76 340 36.12 420 18.1 391 
40 23.27 186 38.43 340 35.92 314 16.5 196 
60 22.25 186 37.82 340 35.54 186 13.5 186 
70 21.71 186 37.5 340 35.34 289 11.9 0 
80 21.07 186 37.11 237 35.1 186 10.03 0 
90 20.19 186 36.58 186 34.78 186 7.43 186 
5.5 Conclusions 
Designing optimal bidding strategies is a challenging task for generators in the 
deregulated electricity market. Existing methods usually assume that the rivals' 
information, such as cost information, bidding parameters and benefit functions, is 
known. However, in reality, most of the above information is business confidential. In 
this section, the optimal bidding problem with incomplete information is studied and a 
novel approach is proposed to solve it. In the proposed approach, statistical methods 
are used to estimate rivals' bidding productions. Furthermore, SVM is applied to 
approximate the relationship between bidding productions and MCP. Based on the 
estimated rivals' bidding productions and MCP, the optimal bidding problem is 
transformed into a stochastic optimization problem, which is solved by the Monte 
Carlo simulation and DE. 
Experiments based on real market data demonstrate that the proposed method can well 
estimate rivals' behaviour. Moreover, significantly improved profits are obtained with 
the proposed method in the experiment. The proposed method is therefore proven 
effective in designing the optimal bidding strategies without knowing rivals' 
confidential information. Findings from this chapter provide a very useful tool for a 
generator strategic bidding in a market environment. 
This chapter, together with the previous chapters form a rather complete framework 
for generation strategic bidding. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, in addition to 
energy sales in the spot market through bidding, generators also get their revenue from 
financial market using different financial instruments. The overall profitability of a 
generator depends on its overall portfolio management plans. In the next chapter, 
developed methodologies for optimal portfolio selection will be presented to form a 
rather comprehensive tool package for a GENCO to achieve risk management purpose 
and optimal risk-return trade-off. 
Chapter 6 
Optimal Portfolio Selection for 
Generators in an Electricity Market 
6.1 Introduction 
A competitive electricity market essentially consists of the day-ahead energy market, 
real-time energy market and ancillary services market. In a deregulated environment 
therefore, GENCOs are facing the problem of optimally allocating their generation 
capacities to different markets for profit maximization. Moreover, the generators have 
greater risks than before because of the significant price volatility in the spot energy 
market introduced by deregulation. To hedge the risks, generators can select a number 
of financial instruments available in the electricity market, such as forward and futures 
contracts [100-102], All the above issues can be considered as a portfolio selection 
problem, which aims at maximizing the return and minimizing the risk of a generator 
by allocating the generator's assets to different markets and financial contracts. The 
portfolio selection problem essentially consists of two sub-problems. The first sub-
problem concerns designing bidding strategies for the generator. This problem has 
been extensively studied in literature [5-7, 103]. Due to the deregulation and 
correspondingly greater market risks, it is important for generators to minimize risk by 
risk management, which is the second sub-problem of generators' portfolio selection. 
Comprehensive studies have been conducted on risk management for generators. The 
financial instruments available in the electricity market are studied in [104-107]. The 
risk management strategies for generators are discussed in [21, 108-111]. Moreover, 
the problem of allocating the capacities between the spot market and financial market 
also has attracted significant attentions [100-102], 
There are two major challenges for constructing the optimal portfolio for a generator: 
(1) Generators' portfolio selection consists of many issues with different 
characteristics, such as allocating the capacities among different markets and 
using a variety of financial contracts to hedge risk. It is therefore difficult to 
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develop a unified model for different markets and contracts. For example, the 
capacity allocation between the spot market and forward contracts is usually 
determined several months in advance. So in the long-term planning horizon, 
how to integrate the problem of optimal bidding strategies in a spot market with 
the problem of designing forward contracts for the generators is a big challenge. 
(2) The selected portfolio is optimal only in the theoretical sense. Its performance 
largely depends on accurately estimating the probability distributions of the 
returns of different markets and contracts. However, these distributions are 
difficult to estimate, due to the greater price uncertainties in the deregulated 
market and the drawbacks of existing estimation techniques. The performances 
of existing portfolio selection approaches are therefore constrained. 
In this chapter, a portfolio selection approach is proposed for GENCOs to allocating its 
generation capacities in different markets and using contracts for risk management. 
The proposed approach addresses all the issues of portfolio selection in a unified 
framework based on the Markowitz portfolio selection model [112, 113]. This 
approach selects the optimal portfolio by optimizing a utility function, which is a 
combination of the portfolio return and risk. The means and variances of different asset 
returns are derived separately. Considering that the electricity price is a heteroscedastic 
time series [93, 114], a time varying volatility time series model is introduced to 
properly model the spot price and estimate the price uncertainties. In this chapter, this 
approach is employed in the long term planning (several months ahead) and has well 
solved the problem of allocating generation capacities between spot market and 
forward contracts. Theoretically, the proposed approach can also be employed to solve 
the short term portfolio selection problem (day ahead), which deals with hedging price 
risks with standardized financial instruments, such as futures contracts. In summary, 
the proposed approach is applicable for handling different available assets in the 
electricity market. Moreover, it is able to provide better estimates of the distributions 
of asset returns by employing advanced statistical and econometrics methods. It 
therefore well addresses the challenges discussed above. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as: The fundamentals of portfolio selection theory 
are discussed in Section 2. In Section 3, a time varying volatility model is firstly 
introduced to model the spot market price. Afterwards, the problems of long term and 
short term portfolio selection are discussed in detail. DE is then introduced as the 
optimizer in the proposed approach. In Section 4, case studies are conducted with real-
world market data. Promising results are obtained to prove that the proposed method is 
effective. Section 5 finally concludes the chapter. 
6.2 Portfolio Selection Theory 
The proposed approach is based on the portfolio selection theory. Generally speaking, 
portfolio selection involves determining a combination of assets to achieve the best 
risk-return trade-off. In finance, asset is meant as probable future economic benefits 
controlled by an entity as a result of past transactions or events, and from which future 
economic benefits may be obtained [112]. For a GENCO, a number of different assets 
are available for constructing a portfolio. For instance, an asset for a generator can be 
the electricity sold through the spot market, the electricity sold through forward 
contracts, or futures for risk hedging. Therefore, the capacity allocation and risk 
management of GENCOs can be modelled together as a portfolio selection problem. 
The goodness of an asset is evaluated by two criteria, expected return and risk. Since 
holding an asset is for obtaining the future benefits, its return is usually uncertain. 
Therefore, only its expected return can be calculated from a statistical sense. Moreover, 
since the return of an asset is uncertain, the asset holder will have the possibility of 
obtaining a return lower than the expected level. This possibility is the risk of the asset. 
Investors generally prefer the asset with higher return and lower risk. In practice 
however, the two goals usually cannot be achieved simultaneously. Therefore, trade-
off between the return and risk should be achieved. The process of achieving this 
trade-off is the portfolio selection, [21]. 
In portfolio selection, the return of an asset is usually modelled as a random variable. 
The mean of the random variable is then considered as the expected return of the asset, 
while the variance represents the risk. Assume that there are m assets available. Denote 
the return of asset i as ri, and the mean and variance of ri as fit and erf respectively. 
Then the return of the portfolio with m assets can be expressed as the weighted sum of 
the m variables: 
m 
r = y\w ir j (6.1) 
i=i 
The mean and variance of the portfolio can be easily given as [93, 114]: 
m 
/"=X (6.2) 
m m 
°"2 - X X WiWj Cm(ri,rj ) (6.3) i=l y'=l 
where cov(/^ r ) is the covariance between /* and . It represents the correlation 
between the returns of asset i and j. 
Since a higher return usually leads to a greater risk, a utility function is usually 
employed as the optimization objective to achieve a proper trade-off [112]: 
In (6.4), A is the risk aversion degree of the investor, which is the generator in this case. 
Objective (6.4) implies that, the utility of a portfolio is enhanced by high expected 
returns and diminished by high risk. Moreover, the risk aversion degree also has vital 
impact on the risk return trade-off. This parameter is determined by the investor itself, 
and usually can be estimated by conducting risk questionnaires [112]. 
In summary, given a set of assets, portfolio selection aims at selecting appropriate 
weights w, to optimize objective (6.4). This problem can be solved with a number of 
optimization techniques, such as DE [76], The problem remaining is how to estimate 
the means, variances and covariances of the assets available to the generator. This 
problem is addressed in the following sections. 
6.3 Portfolio Selection for GENCOs 
In this section, we discuss the details of the proposed approach of selecting optimal 
portfolio for generators. We will address three major problems in applying portfolio 
selection theory in the electricity market: 
• How to model the spot market electricity price, which is the main cause of risks 
for generators. 
• How to obtain accurate estimates of the return parameters. 
• How to apply the portfolio selection theory for different planning horizons. 
[/ = //10.005 xv4x<r .2 (6.4) 
6.3.1 Modelling the Spot Market Electricity Price 
A major way for a generator to sell its power is through the spot energy market. 
Therefore, the spot electricity price has significant impact on generators' profits. 
Moreover, it can also influence the prices of other financial instruments, such as 
futures and option contracts. Therefore, it is a major risk source for generators. It is 
important to properly model the spot price so as to derive the distribution parameters 
of different assets. 
The electricity price in the spot market is highly volatile and difficult to forecast. It is 
widely accepted to be a non-stationary and heteroscedastic time series [93, 114], which 
means that it has time varying mean and variance. Therefore, we cannot directly 
calculate the mean and variance of the return of the spot market, since they are not 
fixed. Instead, a time varying volatility model is introduced in this chapter to 
appropriately model the spot price: 
y , ( 6 - 5 ) 
/=1 7=1 k=1 
£, = a, • v, (6.6) 
v, ~ N(0,1) (6.7) 
X,={Xa,Xu2,...,Xt<l) (6.8) 
P 7=1 
where 
Yt is the spot electricity price at time t; 
X] is the explanatory variables vector at time t; 
et is the noise at time t; 
a, is the standard deviation of the electricity price at time t ; 
erf is the variance of the electricity price at time t. 
In model (6.5)-(6.9), the spot price is represented by a random variable Yt. X\ is the 
vector that consists of all explanatory variables relevant to the price, such as market 
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demand and supply. et is the random noise that cannot be forecasted. The implication 
of this model is that, the spot price Yt is a function of its predecessors Yt_{ , the 
previous noises s,^ , and the explanatory variables X]. Moreover, the variance of the 
electricity price a ] is also determined by the previous noises and the explanatory 
variables. Therefore, the variance is time changing and the model is a time varying 
volatility model. This model is introduced to suit the characteristics of the electricity 
price. We will demonstrate that the electricity price can be reduced with time varying 
volatility in the following sections. 
In model (6.5)-(6.9), A,g, are parameters that should be estimated from 
historical data. In this chapter, the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) [115] is 
employed to obtain the parameter estimates. We introduce the following theorem: 
Theorem 1: Denote Y, ~{yt,..._y1,x;',...x1') as the observations of a time series {y;} and 
the relevant explanatory variables obtained until time t, the conditional log likelihood 
for model (6.5)-(6.9) is given as: 
L0)= Y\ogf{yt\xt,Y,^d) 
t—k+l 
1 
t=k+1 t=k+1 2<J t 
(6.10) 
In (6.10), 0 = (A,g,<t>,a,/?), andf{y,_i,...y,_p,x t)is defined as Equation(6.5). Due to the 
page limit, the proof of Theorem 1 is not given and can be found in [116]. According 
to Theorem 1, the maximum likelihood estimates of X,q,(j),a,p should be the estimates 
that maximize the likelihood function (6.10). An optimization technique, such as 
Gradient Ascent method [116] should be employed to solve the problem and obtain the 
parameter estimates. 
After A, <;,(/>, a, p are estimated, the forecasted mean and variance of the spot price at 
time t can be given as: 
X = (6-11) 
i'=l 7=1 k=1 
C = «0 + YjPjX>,j 
M y=l 
(6.12) 
where i,g,<j>,a,j3 are the estimated values of X,q,<t>,a,p. The mean and variance of the 
return of the spot market can be further derived based on (6.11) and (6.12), which is 
discussed in the following sections. Please note that the above forecasting model is 
inappropriate for handling spikes since spikes are considered as noise in statistics and 
usually not modelled. 
6.3.2 Long Term Portfolio Selection 
As discussed in the introduction, constructing portfolios for a generator involves the 
consideration of different planning horizons. Different planning horizons will lead to 
significantly different approaches, which will be demonstrated as follows. The Long 
Term Portfolio Selection (LTPS), whose planning horizon is usually several months, is 
firstly discussed in this section. Long term portfolio selection mainly considers the 
problem of allocating generation capacities between forward contracts and the spot 
market. Moreover, other financial instruments, such as futures and option contracts, 
can also be considered in LTPS. In this chapter, the main focus is on the forward 
contract, since in practice it is the widely used way to hedge the long term price risk. 
Futures contracts, whose positions are not closed out before the maturity date, can be 
analysed similarly. 
As discussed in Section 2, the return distributions of the forward contract and spot 
market should be firstly derived before the portfolio selection model can be applied. 
Assume that the cost function of a generator follows a quadratic function of its 
dispatched generation capacity: 
C(g) = a + b-g + c-g2 (6.13) 
where g denotes the dispatched capacity in the trading interval. The parameters a,b,c 
are the private information of the generator. 
According to [112, 113], the return of an investment is defined as the revenue minus 
the cost, divided by the cost. Note an important fact that, all the power of a generator is 
actually dispatched through the spot market. For the power that sold through the 
forward contract, the generator just receives or pays the difference between the 
forward strike price and spot price when transactions are settled. Therefore, when 
calculating the costs, the power sold through the forward contract and spot market 
should be considered together, rather than separately. 
In practice, the generator usually selects fulfilling the obligation of forward contracts 
as their priority. Therefore, denote g7and gs as the power sold through the forward 
contract and spot market respectively, the cost of selling power through forward 
contracts can be expressed as: 
C(gf) = a + b-gf+c-gf2 (6.14) 
The cost of selling power through the spot market is: 
C(gs)ic(gf+gs)-c(gf) 
= a + b-(gf+gs) + c-(gf+gs)2-a-b-gf-c-g/ (6-15) 
= b-gs + 2c-gf-gs+c-gs2 
Based on Eqs. (6.14) and (6.15), let pf,ps denote the forward strike price and spot 
price, the return of the forward contract can be calculated as: 
r _ P f g f - C ( g f ) (6 16) 
7 C ( g / ) 
The forward strike price pf is usually determined by the generator and its customer 
together. The negotiation of the forward strike price is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
It is assumed that it has been determined and is a fixed value. 
It is also assumed that the spot market is perfectly competitive, which means that a 
generator can bid at a very low price to ensure it is dispatched without significantly 
decreasing the spot market price. The return of the spot market can then be calculated 
as: 
= P,-g,-C(g,) (6 17) 
C(gs) 
where ps denotes the spot electricity price. 
After deriving the mathematical formulations of rf,rs, we now discuss how to calculate 
their means and variances. In our problem setting, pf is assumed to be a fixed value. 
g is the quantity to be optimized, thus is also fixed in each iteration of the 
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optimization process. Therefore, r f is fixed in each optimization iteration. We then 
have: 
mm Pf.-gf~C(gf) 
C(gf) 
(6.18) 
o*(rf) = 0 (6.19) 
For rs, since the only random variable in • is ps, the mean and variance of rs can be 
given as: 
Till now, the only remaining problem is to estimate the mean and variance of the spot 
price. Forecasting the spot price several months ahead is a long term forecasting 
problem. It is difficult to obtain accurate forecasts and not many advanced forecasting 
techniques are currently available for this problem. In this chapter, a simple price 
model is employed. Denote the planning period as period t. For the mean spot price 
ps(t) at period t, we assume that it is a function of the mean spot price at period t-\, as 
well as GDP and system demand at period t. We thus have: 
Estimating p,y/,co is equivalent to perform a linear regression on the historical data of 
the spot price, GDP and system demand [117]. 
The variance of ps can be obtained by simply calculating the variance of ps in the 
corresponding period in last year. For example, if a generator is designing the portfolio 
for Jul 2007, it can then use the variance of the spot price in Jul 2006 as the estimate. 
Substituting the estimates of mean and variance of ps into Equations (6.20) and (6.21), 
the p(rs) and a2(rs) can be obtained. 
The means and variances of the forward contract and spot market derived in this 
section can be substituted into the portfolio selection model (6.4) to obtain the optimal 
portfolio. The means and variances of other markets and instruments can be derived in 
a i ^ s f l j f e i M - i (6.20) 
1 1 1 1 1 
(6.21) 
ps (?) = p • ps (t -1) + \f/ • GDP(t) + o) • Demand(t) (6.22) 
similar ways. If only the forward contract and spot market are considered, the 
covariance between them is zero, since rf is not a random variable. If other markets or 
contracts are involved in the problem as well, the covariance matrix then has to be 
estimated, which will be investigated in our further research. 
6.3.3 Short Term Portfolio Selection 
Short Term Portfolio Selection (STPS) designs the portfolio several days in advance. 
The generator usually sells a large amount of its power by submitting bids to the day 
ahead spot market. Therefore, designing bidding strategies is an important task in 
STPS. Moreover, the spot electricity price can seriously fluctuate within days. The 
short term price risks can be hedged with a number of financial instruments, such as 
futures or options. The mathematical model for short term portfolio selection has been 
derived as well. This result will be discussed in a future publication. 
6.4 Differential Evolution (DE) 
The proposed approach of selecting optimal portfolio is an optimization problem. A 
DE based optimizer is selected to solve this optimization problem. Although DE had 
been discussed in detail in Chapter 3, for the sake of completeness, the DE used in this 
portfolio optimisation model is briefly reviewed here. DE [118] is a stochastic direct 
search and optimization method. It is widely accepted as an accurate, fast and robust 
optimization method. The main advantage of DE is its simplicity and therefore ease to 
use in solving optimization problems requiring the minimization process with real 
valued and multi-modal (multiple local optima) objective functions. A non-uniform 
crossover, which makes use of child vector parameters to guide through the 
minimization process, is employed in DE. As shown in Figure 6-1, the mutation 
operation with DE is performed by arithmetical combinations of individuals rather 
than perturbing the genes in individuals with small probability as compared with one 
of the most popular Evolutionary Algorithm (EA), GA. Another main characteristic of 
DE is that, it can search directly with the floating point representation, rather than the 
binary representation as used in many basic EAs. The characteristics together with 
other factors of DE make it one of the most suitable optimisation tools for the optimal 
portfolio selection problem. 
It should be noted that the optimization problem in (6.4) can be modified into a Mixed 
Integer Programming (MIP) model which can be solved more efficiently by 
commercial software such as CPLEX [119]. However, for the problem in this chapter, 
a number of assumptions and simplifications have to be made in order to build the MIP 
model. It can then be solved by commercial software such as CPLEX. In this chapter, 
we would like to explore the optimal portfolio with the original objectives and 
constraints in order to make the analysis as comprehensive as possible. DE, like other 
EAs has been proven to be able to locate the global optimal solution and more 
importantly can handle nonlinear, non-convex and discontinues optimization problems. 
Research has proven that compared with other EAs, DE is very efficient for global 
optimization problem. Therefore, DE is used in this chapter. Moreover, with the model 
presented in the chapter, it can be easily modified into MIP form if needed by a user. 
1.Choose Target 2. Random Choice of Two Representation of 
Vector Population Numbers Parameter Vector 
Figure 6-1 A Typical Differential Evolution (DE) [76] 
6.5 Case study 
6.5.1 Experiment Setting 
In this section, the effectiveness of the proposed approach is demonstrated with data in 
a real market. The Australian NEM is selected for case studies in this chapter. The 
price model of the spot market is built based on the market data from 2006 to 2007, 
which is published in the website of NEM [42],We assume that there is a GENCO who 
has two 197-MW fossil generators located in the Queensland market of Australia NEM 
[42], The information of the experiment is given in Table 6-1. 
Table 6-1 Experiment Setting Information 
Private Information Public Information 
Cost Function 
a = 108; 
Historical Data of 
Queensland 
Parameters 
b = 5.7; Market, from 2006 
the Spot Market 
c = 0.02; to 2007 
Risk Aversion Degree 1-10 
Forward Contract 
Price ($/MWh) 
55 
The case study has two main objectives: 
• By comparing the performance of the proposed portfolio with other portfolios, 
it will be proved that the proposed approach is able to achieve a proper trade 
off between return and risk. 
• By altering the risk aversion degree and the parameters of the cost function of 
the generator, the impacts of these parameters on portfolio selection will be 
investigated. 
6.5.2 Experiment Results 
It is assumed that in 30 Jun 2007, the GENCO is designing its portfolio for Jul 2007. 
Model (6.22) is employed to estimate the mean spot price in Jul, and then the 
optimization problem (6.4) is solved with corresponding optimisation tool. The 
portfolio obtained with the proposed method is given as: 
Table 6-2 The Portfolio for July 2007 (A=5) 
Asset Proportion Capacity (MW) 
Forward Contract 33% 130.02 
Spot Market 67% 263.98 
The corresponding return parameters can then be calculated as: 
Table 6-3 Return Parameters (A=5) 
Asset Mean of Return (%) SD of Return (%) 
Forward Contract 2.71 0 
Spot Market 4.96 2.01 
Proposed Portfolio 3.45 1.35 
To validate that the proposed portfolio is superior to alternative strategies, its actual 
revenue is calculated with the real market data of Jul 2007, then compare it with the 
performances of the other two strategies, which are allocating all of the capacity to the 
spot market and allocating all of the capacity to the forward contract. 
Table 6-4 Performance Comparison of Different Portfolios (a=5) 
Portfolio Expected Revenue Actual Revenue Revenue SD 
(M$) (M$) ($) 
Allocating all capacity in spot market 3.4893 3.3887 10651 
Allocating all capacity in forward contract 3.1205 3.1205 0 
Proposed Portfolio 3.3676 3.3672 4135.9 
In Table 6-4, the actual revenue is calculated by assuming that the corresponding 
portfolio is applied, while spot market prices are set as the real market prices in Jul 07. 
As shown in Table 6-4, if the proposed portfolio is employed in Jul 07, its revenue will 
be close to the actual revenue obtained by allocating all of the capacity to the spot 
market. However, the standard deviation of its revenue is much smaller, indicating that 
it has much lower risks than selling all of the power into the spot market. Moreover, 
the difference between the actual revenue and expected revenue of the proposed 
portfolio is insignificant. This implies that the proposed method can appropriately 
estimate the return characteristics of different assets. 
The risk aversion degree represents the generator's attitude towards risk, which has 
significant impact on the portfolio selection. The relationship between the risk aversion 
degree and optimal proportions of assets is plotted in Fig. 6-2. As observed, the 
forward contract will have a higher proportion in the proposed portfolio if the risk 
aversion degree rises. This phenomenon is reasonable since allocating greater capacity 
to the forward contract can decrease risks. 
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Figure 6-2 Risk Aversion Degree v.s. Asset Proportions 
The risk aversion degree and the corresponding means and standard deviations of the 
proposed portfolio are given in Fig. 6-3. Unsurprisingly, the standard deviation of the 
return decreases as risk aversion degree increases, which indicates that the generator 
tends to select a less riskier portfolio if it is more risk averse. 
Risk Aversion Degree 
Figure 6-3 Risk Aversion Degree v.s. Return Mean and SD 
The costs of the generator are other factors that can significantly influence its portfolio 
selection. To study the impact of generator's costs, the parameters a,b,c are 
multiplied by a scale coefficient 5 . The corresponding optimal portfolio is then 
obtained and illustrated in Table 6-5. As shown in Table 6-5, the return mean and SD 
both decrease as the scale coefficient s increases. A greater s indicates greater 
generation costs. It is more difficult for the generator to gain profits in the spot market 
if its costs rise. Therefore, higher costs weaken the generator's incentive to take risks. 
It thus tends to select forward contracts to hedge its risks. 
Table 6-5 Cost Scale Coefficient and Corresponding Optimal Portfolio 
s 
Return Mean of the Proposed 
Portfolio(%) 
Return SD of the Proposed 
Portfolio(%) 
Portion of the Forward 
Contract 
0.6 6.37 1.9 0.346 
0.8 4.54 1.51 0.354 
1 3.44 1.25 0.366 
1.2 2.7 1.07 0.383 
1.4 2.17 0.93 0.410 
6.6 Conclusions 
In deregulated electricity markets, generators have a difficult task of selecting the 
optimal portfolio, which consists of a variety of markets and contracts. Theoretically, 
the portfolio selection problem aims at allocating generation capacities to proper 
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markets and financial contracts, so as to achieve the optimal trade-off between return 
and risk. In this chapter, a method is proposed to solve the generator portfolio selection 
problem. According to different planning horizons, the problem is divided into two 
sub-problems, long term portfolio selection and short term portfolio selection. The 
authors derive the mathematical formulations of different asset returns for both the 
long term and short term portfolio selection. A time varying volatility model is 
introduced to model the spot market price, which is highly volatile. The portfolio 
selection problem is finally formulated as an optimization problem, which can be 
solved by a DE based optimizer. The proposed method is tested with real market data. 
Its effectiveness is demonstrated by obtaining promising performance in the case 
studies. 
With the new methodologies of this chapter, an overall package of a risk management 
tool for GENCOs is built. This package provides optimal bidding strategies for the 
generator companies with market uncertainties and incomplete information. It also 
provides a portfolio optimisation solution methodology. 
In the following chapter, another important functionality - price modelling - for the 
proposed framework will be presented. 
Chapter 7 
Electricity Market Clearing Price 
Forecasting 
In a competitive electricity market, price modelling is one of the key activities for both 
ISO and market participants. GENCOs need such information in forming their market 
strategy in view of bidding and hedging contacts. Transmission companies need such 
information in formulating market benefits to justify transmission network planning 
options. In this chapter, fuzzy IA and RBF neural network based models are proposed 
for MCP forecasting with detailed real market data analysis. 
7.1 Introduction 
In the competitive electricity market, price forecasting can help to build up effective 
cost risk management plans for the participating companies. Currently, market 
participants use different instruments to control and minimize the risks as a result of 
the market reference price. If the market reference price can be properly predicted, 
generators and retailers can reduce their risks and maximize their outcomes further. 
Because of the great similarity between price and load forecast [120], there are many 
approaches we can borrow from load forecasting. In previous studies, regression 
models [121], neural networks [122-125], and data mining [126, 127] based techniques 
have been employed for this purpose. Also the statistic time series models including 
ARIMA [128] and GARCH models [93] have been proved to be effective with 
satisfactory prediction performance. However, according to references [129], neural 
networks methods for forecasting have been shown to be able to give better 
performance in short-term electricity price forecasting. 
Due to a number of advantages compared with other types of neural networks, such as 
better approximation capabilities, simpler network structures and faster learning 
algorithms, Radial Basis Function (RBF) neural networks are continuously increasing 
their popularity in nonlinear system modelling [123]. RBF neural networks can 
approximate any continuous function defined on a compact set to any prescribed 
degree of accuracy by sufficiently expanding the size of network [130, 131]. RBF 
neural networks form a special network architecture, which consists of three layers, 
namely the input, hidden and output layers. The structure of a typical Multi-Input 
Single-Output (MISO) RBF neural network is shown in Figure 7-1. 
However, how to choose suitable network structures has always been a problem which 
blocks the wide application of RBF neural networks. A small network may never 
converge, while a large one converges fast but lacks generalization ability. Meanwhile, 
due to the great influence of cluster centres and radii of the RBF on the overall 
performance of RBF neural networks, an effective approach should be introduced. 
Currently, the majority of the training schemes for RBF neural networks can be 
classified as one-phase learning and two-stage training. 
• One-phase learning. With this learning procedure, the parameters of hidden 
layer activated functions and the output connection weights are adjusted 
simultaneously with objective, which is minimization of network output errors. 
• Two-stage training. Two layers of RBF neural network are trained separately; 
first the parameters of hidden layer activated functions are determined in self-
organizing manner or assigned randomly in advance, followed by output 
connection weights adjusted through kinds of supervised approaches. 
7.2 Fuzzy Immune Algorithm (FIA) 
The global optimization approaches are mainly the EAs, such as GA, PSO, and DE. 
They can be used to train the neural networks due to their global optimization 
capabilities. Although the heuristic methods do not always guarantee discovering 
globally optimal solutions in finite time, they often provide fast and reasonable 
solutions. Although GA can ensure that the colony evolves and the solutions change 
continually, it may lack strong capacity of producing the best offspring individuals and 
causes the speed to slow when near global optimum and sometimes trapped into local 
optima. DE is a very powerful evolutionary algorithm, but the greedy updating method 
and intrinsic differential property usually leads the computing process to be trapped by 
local optima. The PSO converges quickly, but has a slow fine-tuning ability of the 
solution. Once it gets stuck into the local optima, it is very hard to jump out from the 
local optimum. Generally speaking, each method has its own merits and drawbacks. 
Many attempts try to merge some of their individual implementations together into a 
new algorithm, so that it can overcome individual disadvantages as well as benefit 
from each others' advantages. 
With the development of immunology and research methods, the mechanism of 
biological immune system has gradually been discovered by researchers. Because of 
the powerful ability of information processing and special characteristics such as 
diversity, adaptive trait, biologic immune system has become a hot spot of artificial 
intelligence. Immune Algorithm (LA) imitates the principle of the defence system 
annihilates foreign disease-causing bacteria or viruses through self-learning and self-
adjusting. Although IA is very similar to GA, there are essential differences in the 
production theory for memory and population. Compared with GA and other EAs, IA 
promotes general search ability through the mechanism based on memory pool. At the 
same time, it realizes the function of self-adjusting by calculating affinity and 
concentration. To some extent, it avoids premature convergence. Here a new IA is 
proposed, which uses the fuzzy system to realize the adaptive selection of two key 
parameters (crossover possibility and mutation possibility), addressing the 
convergence speed and calculation precision problems in the basic IA. The steps of the 
FIA are depicted as shown in Fig. 7-2 [132], 
Figure 7-2 Flowcharts of a Fuzzy Immune Algorithm 
The calculation strategy of FIA, [132], is represented as follows: 
Step-1. For the practical problems, the antigens and antibodies in the immune system 
represent the objective functions and feasible solutions, respectively. IA uses affinity 
and concentration values as discriminators of the quality of solutions represented by 
the antibodies in one population which are calculated by: 
Asit=rx(\-r)-X 
where, 
r is the random number in the interval in (0,1); 
i is the location index of antibodies in current population which are arranged 
in terms of function values in ascending sequence; and 
As-1 is the affinity value of antibody i of generation t. 
Then the individuals should be returned to their original locations. The most attractive 
feature of this definition is that the affinity value is only relevant to the locations index 
rather than real fitness values. 
P M (7.2) 
Ml H B 
[0, otherwise (7 3) 
where, 
Euclidean distance between the two randomly selected 
antibodies; 
1 Euclidean distance threshold, generally 1 = le-6; 
p Population size. 
Step-2. A roulette selection is then implemented based on the computed selection 
probabilities for the antibodies. This allocates every antibody a probability of being 
selected proportionally according to affinity and concentration values. The equation 
for computing selection rates is: 
A , , 
Csit 
P s ' < > = r i 
f j A v l 
Step-3. Crossover and mutation are implemented at this step. Crossover is one of the 
primary IA operators that promote the new region exploration ability in the search 
space. Generally, crossover rate should be chosen relatively large [133], between 0.7 
and 1.0. Mutation is another IA operator which guarantees the diversity of the 
population. In the reference [133], the mutation rate should be chosen between 
thousandths and hundredths. According to reference [134], the crossover and mutation 
rates can be adjusted by statistical methods, SVM or neural networks. However, when 
the above methods were compared with the fuzzy system approach proposed here, we 
found that the fuzzy system approach makes better contributions to the IA in both time 
consumption and calculating precision. 
Crossover and mutation fuzzier input data are f d ( t ) , Pc and Fd(t) , Pm in which 
fd(t) = \ a n d / ( ' ) ' / ™ ( 0 , / „ b x ( 0 are the average, minimum and 
J imxVV J minV ' / 
maximum function values of t iterations respectively. APc and APm are the changes in 
crossover and mutation rates between t and t-\ iterations which also are fuzzier output 
data. The membership functions for input f^t), Pc and output APc of crossover fuzzier 
are shown in Figs. 7-3 - 7-5. The membership functions for /^0, Pm, APm of mutation 
fuzzier can be drawn in the same way, shown in Figs. 7-637-7. According to a great 
deal of experimental data and expert knowledge, the fuzzy decision for APc is made 
and shown in following Tables 7-1 and 7-2. Using the same theory, we can produce 
the fuzzy decision table for APm. 
In these figures and tables, the following notations are used: 
Negative Huge (NH), Negative Large (NL), Negative Medium (Nm), Negative Small 
(NS), Zero (ZE), Positive Small (PS), Positive Medium (PM), Positive Large (PL), and 
Positive Huge (PH). 
Figure 7-3 The chart of membership functions for input variable 
Figure 7-4 The chart of membership functions for input variable 
Figure 7-5 The chart of membership functions for output variable 
Figure 7-6 The chart of membership functions for input variable 
Figure 7-7 The chart of membership functions for output variable 
Table 7-1 The chart of membership functions for output variable 
\APc(t) 
f A n \ 
Fuzzy decision table for APc(t) 
NH NL NM NS ZE PS PM PL PH 
ZE PH PH PL PM PM PS PS PS ZE 
PS PH PL PM PS PS PM NS NM NL 
PM PL PM PS PS ZE NS NM NL NH 
PL PH PL PM PS PS ZE NS NM NL 
PH PH PH PL PM PM PM PS PS ZE 
Table 7-2 The chart of membership functions for output variable 
\APm(l) 
§iX 
Fuzzy decision table for APm(t) 
NH NL NM NS ZE PS PM PL PH 
ZE ZE ZE ZE NS NS NM NM NL NH 
PS PM PS PS ZE ZE NS NS NM NL 
PM PM PM PM PS PS ZE NS NS NM 
PL PL PL PM PS PS ZE NS NS NS 
PH PH PH PL PM PM PM PS PS ZE 
An arithmetic crossover operator is described as follows: 
Abit =bxAbm, +(l-b)xAbnl 
(7.5) 
And two improved uneven self-adaptive mutation operators which are selected 
randomly in the algorithm are described as the following formulas: 
Due to the uncertainties of the mutation rate, F0 = [0.6,1.2] is an important parameter in 
the mutation implementation, a self-adaptive method is introduced which guarantees 
the diversity of population, t and T denote the current and maximum iteration, 
respectively. Also, the overflow judgment is needed, if generated offspring exceeds 
given bounds, the previous implementations would be cancelled. 
Step-4. Finally, antibodies which have high affinity values will evolve into next 
iteration and be added into the memory pool. A given number of new antibodies which 
comply with Gauss distribution around the best antibody will be added into population, 
to replace those which have lower affinity values. Meanwhile, due to the fact that the 
massively parallel search is resource intensive, only small populations can be evolved 
in short time. Thus, the inadequate sampling of the search space leads to the loss of 
diversity information and thus to fast premature convergence. To overcome this 
drawback, a diversification mechanism for introducing is required. This can be 
achieved to some degree by neighbourhood search, Memetic Algorithm (MA) [135]. 
Then the algorithm returns to step-2, unless the maximum number of iterations is 
reached. Otherwise the algorithm stops as the network corresponding to the smallest 
prediction error is selected. 
7.3 Configuration of The RBF Neural Network 
7.4.1 Learning Theory 
For typical RBFNN, if wt is output weights, is the output of i'h neuron, 
X=[x\jC2,---Jm] is input vector, C, is the hidden node centre locations of i'h neuron, y is 
linear summation of output of hidden layer neurons. If the RBF is Gauss function 
(7.6) 
Ab., = Abi t +F0xT ™ x ( Abm , - Abn t ) (7.7) 
I W f f i 
*,{x,c,)=e <c->2 ( 7 8 ) 
y = YJwi<j>j{X,Ci)+e 
(7.9) 
For one set of training data, the equation can be transformed into 
M B 
" (7.10) 
And then 
Y = wlQi+El 
El=w2Q2+E2 ( 7 1 2 ) 
En-X=wnQ„+En ( 7 1 3 ) 
Therefore the given equations can be transformed into 
+™SQn~K)+E„ (7.14) 
Obviously the influence of Qn-Rn can be eliminated by change w1,w2,...,wn_l 
into wj,w2,...,wn_x and then 
En-l=WnRn+En (7.15) 
J k II2 = (£„-, - KK J (£„-, - ^ J ) 
| § ElA-x - + 
= ||£„_, ||2 - + K'KR ( ? J 6 ) 
From above equation, we can conclude that the target of the n' training is to find W'„ 
2 
and C in order to minimize ||2s„|| . 
7.4.2 Training Steps 
Because a set of orthogonal sequential vectors R\, R2, Rn is needed, which can be 
calculated by Qi, Q2, •••, Qn 
(7.17) 
(7.18) 
2,3...) 
(7.19) 
From the discussion above, we can get to know that 
m 
•2 
= -2Et_ ,R_ + 2w_Rt_R_ 
dw. (7.20) 
(7.21) 
Here the R„ can be optimized by the fuzzy IA. After that the output connection weights 
can be calculated by 
W = {Q tQYq tY (7.22) 
7.4 Forecasting Simulation Examples 
7.4.1 Benchmark Function Simulation 
In order to mathematically illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach, a 
bench mark chaos time series is used as the second case study. The orientation of time 
series prediction involves mainly the setup of prediction horizons and the type of 
chaotic time series (e.g. noise-free or noised data). According to the prediction 
horizons, the prediction falls simply into two categories: short-term prediction and 
long-term prediction. Both noise-free and noised Mackey-Glass chaos time series [136] 
are used here. The time series can be generated by the following difference equation: 
x(t + l) = a *('~r) +(1 -b)x(t) (7.23) 
The chaos time series generated by the above equation, will illustrate chaos 
characteristics when r > 17. So this equation is usually applied to test the learning and 
generation ability of neural networks. In this chapter, the parameters are set as follows: 
a=0.2,6 = 0.1, C = \0,T = \1 (7.24) 
Mackey-Glass chaos time series long-term prediction is more difficult than short-term 
prediction. It requires more neurons and longer training time. However, too many 
neurons in the hidden layer may result into decreasing generation ability with the 
network. The proposed method can be used to reduce the number of neurons of neural 
networks and in the same time to improve the generation ability. The following 
function is chosen to approximate the Mackey-Glass chaos time series: 
x{t + n) = f\x{t),-,x(t-2),x(t-i)\,r, = 5,\Q 
x(t) = 1.2, t = 1,2,•••17 
Total of 300 data points were generated with the first 200 data for training the neural 
network and the remaining data to check the generalization ability of the network. The 
results are provided in Figs. 7-8-7-11 . 
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Figure 7-9 FIA RBF Chaos Time Series Prediction Testing Result ( AT=5 ) 
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Figure 7-10 FIA RBF Chaos Time Series Prediction Training Result (AT=10) 
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Figure 7-11 FIA RBF Chaos Time Series Prediction Training Result ( Ar=10) 
In order to test the robustness of the proposed algorithm, the normal distribution noise 
was added into the training data. The result shows that if the noised data were used for 
network training, the prediction performance will be slightly influenced. The best 
results are shown as Fig.7-12 and Fig.7-13. Summary of the studies are given in Table 
7-3. 
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Figure 7-12 FIA RBF Chaos Time Series Prediction Training Result (AT=5, Add noise) 
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Figure 7-13 FIA RBF Chaos Time Series Prediction Testing Result ( A T = 5 ) 
Table 7-3 Summary of Chaos Time Series Prediction Experiment Data 
Mackey-Glass Time Series A T = 5 AT = 10 AT=5+Noise 
Neuron Number 11 24 17 
Training MSE 1.633e-3 4.523e-3 6.173e-3 
Testing MSE 1.688e-3 4.222e-3 6.777e-3 
7.4.2 Electricity Reference Price Forecasting 
In this section, the proposed forecasting method is tested with the Queensland 
electricity regional reference price. The Queensland market is part of the Australian 
NEM which is composed of the states of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, 
Queensland and Tasmania. The market price data are taken from the NEMMCO 
website [42]. It is widely accepted that the electricity price is highly volatile and 
difficult to predict. In the following analysis, the proposed method will be used on 
such data series to illustrate its capability in handling electricity price data series. 
There are three types of seasons each year in Australia: winter (May-Aug), middle 
(Mar-Apr, Sep, Oct) and summer (Nov-Feb) [137]. The simulation experiment is 
performed based on history data of the Australia NEM. The two main factors which 
influence the electricity regional reference price are total demand and dispatchable 
generation, which are chosen as inputs of the RBF neural network, and the output is 
the relevant day-ahead electricity regional reference price (RRP). In the NEM, a time 
interval is 5 minutes, and there are 288 time intervals in a trading day. According to 
NEM, a trading day for the NEM starts at 4:00 A.M. in one day and ends at 4:00 A.M. 
the next day [42], 
Normally the price spikes need to be removed as noise before the prediction 
algorithms are applied; otherwise the prediction algorithms may result in large errors. 
However, the price spikes also have significant influence in the electricity market. In 
this test, in order to strike the right balance between these two aspects, we adopt the 
wavelet de-noising technique [138] is adopted to process the collected data samples. 
The prediction results are presented in Figs. 7-14 and 7-15. 
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Figure 7-15 Electricity Reference Price Forecasting Testing Result 
7.4.3 Results Analysis 
As clearly shown in the result, it can be concluded that, the proposed hybrid training 
method for RBF neural network overcomes the blindness in choosing a suitable 
network structure. Obviously the neural network optimized by this self-learning 
method ensures the overall generation ability. The promising network predictions 
performance on the price data illustrated the efficiency of the proposed method. 
It is unpractical to predict a whole year's data with one artificial neural network model 
because it is a nontrivial task and the processing would be very complicated due to a 
large amount of data involved, and alternative approaches should be used, although the 
result might be useful for GENCOs or ISOs. Moreover, the weeks-ahead and months-
ahead long horizon prediction lacks strict theory basis, because there is not certain 
relationship between different weeks and months, only some similarity could be found 
from the same week and month in previous different years. Furthermore, the dates of 
week days, weekends, and holidays are totally different within two years. In addition, 
the factors of weather condition could be taken into consideration and some extreme 
contingencies [139] are also unpredictable. 
The most effective approach for regional reference price prediction is to develop 
specially designed tools for holiday and the spike effect, and take into account the 
historical information of previous years, as well as other relevant data such as weather 
conditions. 
7.5 Conclusions 
A new hybrid training method for RBF neural networks was proposed in order to 
optimize network structures and parameters, contrary to the most standard Artificial 
Neural Network (ANN) training methods, where the structure is selected by a time 
consuming trial and error procedure. The result achieved suggests that, the proposed 
hybrid training algorithms have good effects on improving stability and generalization 
ability of neural networks. And the availability of this method is proved by applying 
RBF neural networks in predicting of Mackey-Glass chaos time series and forecasting 
of electricity reference price of Queensland in Australia. The successful neural 
network forecasting on the validation data set illustrates the efficiency of the method 
and showed that it can be used as a reliable tool for forecasting modelling. 
In the following chapter, a risk assessment framework will be presented to further the 
usefulness and analysis of electricity market price modelling. Together with this 
chapter, it will complete the GENCO's side bidding and risk management research in 
this thesis. 
Chapter 8 
Assessing the Risks of Electricity Trading 
In the previous chapters, strategic bidding mechanism and price modelling 
methodologies have been presented. These frameworks and methodologies provide 
useful tools for GENCO's operation in an electricity market. As discussed earlier, 
price modelling is a key functionality required for both the GENCO and ISO. In this 
chapter, a detailed risk assessment method is presented to study the impact of volatility 
of spot price on the risks of a GENCO. A framework is also proposed for assessing the 
market risk exposure of a given portfolio for a GENCO. To further the price modelling 
work presented in previous chapters, in this framework, a mean-reverting jump-
diffusion model is employed to model the spot price and a nonlinear regression 
technique is proposed to model the relationship between spot price and relevant factors. 
The risk neutral process of the spot price is also developed and presented in this 
chapter. Finally Value at Risk and stress testing methods are employed to quantify the 
market risk exposure of a given portfolio with detailed case studies. This chapter 
completes the coverage of GENCOs bidding and associated risk management practices 
in a deregulated electricity market. 
8.1 Introduction 
As studied in earlier chapters, among all challenges in a deregulated electricity market, 
the strong volatility of the spot price remains one of the most significant challenges in 
the market. This strong volatility is caused by the unique characteristics of electricity, 
such as non-storability and inelastic demand. Unrestricted exposure to spot price risks 
can lead to severe consequences. In February 2004, the high prices in Texas during a 
3-day ice storm caused the bankruptcy of an electricity retailer which was exposed to 
spot market prices. In the Australian market, the price spike can be as high as 
9,000$/MWh, while the spot price is usually 40-50$/MWh under normal 
circumstances over most of the time. The significant market risks have given rise to a 
variety of electricity financial instruments and stimulated strong interests in effective 
risk management techniques. 
In the past, extensive research has been conducted on electricity market risk 
management. Prior to the deregulation, several risk sources have been identified and a 
review of these risk sources is given in [140], The work in this chapter evaluates 
different risk management techniques in an integrated resource-planning context, 
focusing on the flexibility and robustness of the different strategies. 
In the deregulated market, the spot price risk is widely recognized as an important 
issue to address. Forward/futures contracts are widely used as financial instruments to 
hedge the spot price risk. It is therefore an interesting problem to study how to 
construct an appropriate portfolio of spot electricity and futures/forward contracts. The 
authors of [141] propose a model of financial risk management and use the concept of 
efficient frontier to illustrate the trade-off between profit and risk. In [142], the optimal 
generation portfolio is constructed by employing a utility function to achieve a 
reasonable profit-risk trade-off. 
Besides forward and futures contracts, other financial derivatives have also been 
introduced to meet the needs of market participants. These derivatives include vanilla 
options and exotic options like spark spread options, swing options and swaptions 
[143-147]. These derivatives are currently actively traded in both exchanges and over-
the-counter (OTC) markets. The number of papers concerning the valuation of 
electricity derivatives is still scarce. Most of the existing research on electricity 
derivatives pricing employ the widely-used mathematical financial models like Black-
Scholes models and Geometric Brownian motion [148], Some papers have also paid 
attention to the special characteristics of electricity. For example, some papers argue 
that the model of electricity prices should incorporate time-changing volatility and the 
possibility of jumps in prices [143, 146, 149]. Others on the contrary, emphasize the 
importance of modelling the seasonal patterns of electricity prices and its mean 
reversion [147]. Other models used to model spot prices include GARCH and its 
variants [150, 151] and Markov regime switching model [152]. There are also models 
proposed for direct modelling of electricity forward curves [153, 154], 
In this chapter, a comprehensive framework is presented to assess the market risk 
exposure of a given portfolio. In the proposed approach, a mean-reverting jump-
diffusion model is employed to model the spot electricity price. This approach is 
different from that of Chapter 7 where the forecast relays on artificial intelligence 
methods. To better capture the predictable component of the spot price, a nonlinear 
regression technique is introduced to model the relationship between the spot price and 
its relevant factors such as demand and supply. Moreover, the periodic behaviour of 
the electricity price caused by the seasonal variation of temperature will also be taken 
into account. The maximum likelihood estimator of the model will be derived and DE 
will be employed to estimate model parameters. 
Based on the proposed spot price model, the corresponding risk-neutral process of the 
spot price can also be obtained. Any electricity derivatives can then be valued as the 
expected value, under risk neutral distribution, of its payoffs discounted to the 
valuation date with the risk-free interest rate. The proposed framework can therefore 
incorporate any electricity derivatives into the risk assessment. 
The proposed framework uses Value-at-risk (VaR) and stress testing to quantify the 
market risk exposure of a given portfolio. VaR is the worst loss of a portfolio at a 
specified confidence level. It measures the total portfolio risk and takes into account 
the portfolio diversification and leverage. Since VaR only measures the downside risk 
of a portfolio under normal market conditions, the stress testing, which calculates the 
potential loss under extreme market conditions, is employed to complement VaR and 
give a comprehensive measurement of the market risk. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 8.2 briefly introduces the ideas 
of the proposed risk management framework. Section 8.3 discusses the spot price 
model, the derivatives pricing approach and the kernel regression technique in more 
details. In Section 8.4, comprehensive case studies are conducted to verify the 
effectiveness of the proposed approach. 
8.2 Overview of the Proposed Framework 
In practice, the most important step of risk management is to quantify the risk 
exposure of a portfolio. The risk manager will then take necessary actions based on the 
estimated risk and the risk management policies of the company. A framework to 
assess the risk of electricity trading is proposed in this chapter. In this section the main 
procedure of the framework is briefly introduced. The main idea of the framework is to 
construct the spot price model based on the historical market data, then value the given 
portfolio based on the estimated model. Monte Carlo simulation will be employed to 
generate different spot price paths and based on which the VaR of the portfolio can be 
calculated. The procedure of the framework is given as follows: 
(1) Model estimation 
Given a specific spot price model, its parameters are firstly estimated from the 
historical data. The risk neutral process is then obtained based on the estimated model. 
(2) Generate a price path 
A spot price series will be generated based on the model estimated from step (1). The 
valuation of the portfolio will be based on the randomly generated spot price path. 
(3) Value the given portfolio 
All the positions in the given portfolio will be valued according to the price path 
generated in step (2). These positions can be the power traded in spot market, and any 
types of derivatives. 
(4) Repeat (2) and (3) for N times, where N is the number of the iterations of the 
Monte Carlo simulation. 
(5) Based on the N estimated values of the portfolio, obtain its VaR. 
(6) Perform the stress testing to obtain the potential maximum loss under 
extreme market conditions. 
The basic procedure of the proposed framework is illustrated in Fig. 8-1. We will 
conduct several case studies to demonstrate that it is effective. 
Figure 8-1 The Proposed Risk Management Framework 
8.3 The Proposed Risk Management Approach 
In this section, the details of the proposed approach of electricity trading risk 
assessment will be introduced first. The spot price model is firstly introduced. The risk 
neutral process based on the proposed spot price model will also be presented. 
Subsequently, how to value the electricity derivatives based on the proposed model 
will be given. Two approaches, VaR and stress testing, of risk measurement will be 
introduced. Since in the proposed approach, the kernel based regression and 
differential evolution algorithm will be employed, we finally give brief introductions 
to these two methods. 
8.3.1 Modelling the Spot Market Price 
The electricity price in the spot market is assumed to follow a stochastic process which 
has two components. The first component is considered to be deterministic, while the 
second one is assumed to follow a jump augmented diffusion process. The spot price 
Yt can therefore be expressed as follows: 
Y,=f(t) + S, (8.1) 
, where S, is the random component. 
In practice, f(t) is a function of the factors that can influence the electricity price, such 
as load, generation capacity and temperature. Since the relationship between the price 
and its relevant factors is usually nonlinear, the kernel based regression [154] 
technique is used to estimate function/(/). 
In this proposed approach, the random component S, is assumed to follow a process of 
the form: 
dS, = —kStdt + adX + Jd7r(</>) (8.2) 
where k > 0 , a represents the volatility of the process, and dX is the variation of a 
standard Brownian motion, / r ( ^ ) represents a Poisson counting process [155] with 
mean $ ; J is the jump size, which follows a normal distribution N(ju,S2) . 
Therefore, equation (8.2) essentially represents a mean reverting jump-diffusion 
process with a zero long-run mean and a mean reversion rate of k . The occurrences of 
jumps are governed by 7r{</>). Following the common practices of financial modelling, 
we assume that the Brownian motion X , the Poisson process TT(^) and the jump size 
J are independent from each other. 
From Eq. (8.1), we have St=Y,~ f(t), substitute it into (8.2) we have: 
diYt \ / ( O ) = ~ f (?y)dt X a d X + JdTT^ (8.3) 
Equation (8.3) shows that if Y, is greater than /(?), it will move down on average, 
while on the other hand it will rise on average. In the long run Yt converges to/(?). 
Note that the only uncertainties of the model come from three sources dX, d7r{(f>) 
and J . 
To value the electricity derivatives, a powerful approach is the risk-neutral pricing 
[156], Generally speaking, risk-neutral pricing assumes that electricity financial 
markets are risk-neutral. All financial instruments will therefore yield an identical 
return of the risk free interest rate. Theoretically the risk-neutral assumption is 
equivalent to the no arbitrage assumption. In electricity markets however, the non-
storability of the electricity weakens the non-arbitrage assumption. The market price of 
risk [144] should therefore be introduced to adjust the drift rate of the risk-neutral 
process. Following the approach used in [157], the adjusted risk-neutral process can be 
given as: 
dS, = kC lr S, )dt + <ydX + Jd7r{<j)) (8.4) 
k 
where Z is the market price of risk, which can be estimated from the historical data 
[144], 
The statistical properties of S, can be analysed by deriving the characteristic function. 
For a time interval [0, 7], the characteristic function F(S,T;W) [158] can be obtained 
by solving the Kolmogorov backward equation (KBE): 
U M B 1 I S g f E I ; - F(S)] = 0 (8.5) k dS 2 dS oT 
with the boundary condition F(S,T = 0; w) = eJwS. Here j = and w is the 
characteristic function parameter. As proved in [158], the solution to (8.5) is: 
F(S, T- w) = ea(7>)+5/?(7>) (8.6) 
a(T- w) = \((-Aaj3(T; w) + - a2p2JT w) + <j>E[em™ - X\)dT (8.7) 
J3(T;W) = jwe~kT 
Then the -«th moment of S, can be obtained by differentiate F(S, T\ w) with respect to 
w for n times when w- 0. The conditional mean of S, can therefore be calculated as: 
mm = + - + S0e-kt (8.9) k k 
Considering S =Yt- fit), we finally obtain the conditional mean of the spot price: 
E0[Y,] = At) ^ ) ( 1 -e-kl) + (Y0 -/(0))e~h (8.10) 
8.3.2 Price Model Parameter Estimation 
The Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) method will be employed to estimate the 
model parameters. Assume that a series of spot electricity prices {Y,},t = \.T has been 
observed, and we can estimate {f(t)},t = \..T with the kernel regression technique 
discussed in the following sections. We can then obtain a series of observations of 
process (8.2): 
S, = Y , ^ f ( t ) (8.11) 
The discrete form of process (8.2) can be derived as follows: 
• - s,^ = » . , + s + (7T(t;(/)) - 7r{t -1;#))./ (8.12) 
s~N( 0,o-2) (8.13) 
From (8.12) we can see that the conditional probability density of S, is the sum of a n 
ormal and a Poisson distribution. To obtain the ML estimator of model (8.12)-(8.13), 
we assume that at most one price jump can occur in each time interval \t, t +1] . This 
assumption is reasonable for high frequency data, e.g. data at daily frequency [158], 
Based on our assumption, the occurrence probability of price jumps in a given time in 
terval can then be well approximated with a Bernoulli distribution with parameter <f>. 
The proof of using Bernoulli approximation of Poisson distribution can be found in [ 1 
58]. Based on the Bernoulli approximation, the conditional density of St will follow a 
normal distribution, since both the noise e and jump size J are normally distributed. 
If a price jump occurs in a time interval [/, t +1], the conditional density of S, will be: 
(S, +fcs,.!-AO2 
/fcS, . \ 2 e 2(ct2+*2) (8.14) 
V2^r(cr2 +S2) 
Similarly, if no price jump occurs, the conditional density will be: 
1 (5, )2 
P0IS,\ = ^ (8.15) 
Then the overall conditional density of S, can be given as the weighted sum of Px and 
Po-
ns, = + (1 - #)P0 (8.16) 
It should be noted that | St_x] is also normally distributed because it is a linear 
combination of normal distributions. 
Following the common practices of financial modelling, we assume that St is a 
Markov process [159], Therefore, S, is only determined by the information available 
at time t S i . In other words, observations before time tW 1 will not help to improve 
forecasts. Under this assumption and according to the Bayes theorem, the conditional 
density of S, over the time interval [0, T ] can be given as: 
- P C ' H E S B O M l 'Wi 3 (8-17) 
t = l 
The conditional likelihood function is derived as: 
flljEh fi 'tf'Hi ( 8 i 8 ) t=i 
where G = (k, er, /u, 5, </>y is the parameters to be estimated. The ML estimates of 
9 are the values that maximize (8.18). 
8.3.3 Valuing the Electricity Portfolio 
The essential step of risk management is to estimate the value of a given portfolio. 
According to the risk neutral pricing theory, all derivatives should be valued at their 
expected payoffs discounted with the risk free interest rate. In this chapter, it is 
assumed that the risk free interest rate is constant. Since the proposed framework is 
based on the risk neutral process derived in Section 8.3.1, it is very flexible in that any 
electricity derivatives, whose underlying is spot electricity, can be easily handled. 
Moreover, the spot price model can also be replaced with other spot models, which can 
lead to risk-neutral processes. 
Many different derivatives can be traded in global electricity markets. In this chapter 
the Australian NEM is selected for case studies. At this stage, only the valuation 
problems of two widely-used derivatives are studied, namely swap and cap. Other 
derivatives can be future work. 
The swap [144] is the simplest and most commonly-traded forward contract in the 
Australian market. The swap in the Australian market can be traded both in the 
exchange and OTC market. Generally speaking, an electricity swap is an agreement for 
the exchange of the right to settle a specific notional quantity of electric energy (in 
MWh) at a fixed price for a contract for the right to settle the same quantity of electric 
energy at a floating price. The fixed price is agreed by the two counterparties. The 
floating price on the other hand is usually the spot market price. For each half an hour 
of the duration of the swap, the fixed price payer (long position) pays the fixed (strike) 
price multiplied by the notional amount of the swap for that period. In return, the fixed 
price receiver (short position) pays the spot price multiplied by the notional amount. 
Therefore, the fixed price payer essentially receives the difference between the spot 
price and the strike price. If we denote the strike price of the swap as F0 , assume that 
the notional quantity of the swap is Q MW in each half an hour period, and the swap 
has a duration of T half-hour periods; the payoff of a long position of the swap can 
then be given mathematically as: 
P ^ ( X , - F { ( 8 . 1 9 ) 
An electricity cap is essentially a call option where the buyer has the right but not the 
obligation to buy the electricity at the strike price. If the pool price turns out to be 
greater than the strike price, the cap will be exercised automatically and the owner of 
the cap will obtain a cash settlement equal to the difference between the strike price 
and spot price. Otherwise the cap will not be exercised and no cash flow is generated. 
A standardized cap with a strike of 300 $/MWh is traded in the Sydney futures 
exchange. Assume that the cap has a notional quantify of Q MW in each half an hour 
period, and has a duration of T half-hour periods, the payoff of the cap can then be 
given as: 
P = ^ m a x ( ^ - 300,0) x ^ (8.20) 
/=i 2 
Based on the risk neutral process (8.4), the value of a swap at time t = 0 can be 
calculated as: 
V = e-TE^(Jt-F{•)><% 
1=1 ^ 
= e (8-21) 
** t=i 
Substituting (8.10) into (8.21) we can obtain the closed form solution of the swap 
value. 
It is difficult to derive the closed-form solution for the cap, we can however employ 
simulation based approach to compute its value. The procedure is as follows: 
(1) Generate a simulated price series Y , t = \ . . . T ; 
(2) Calculate the simulated cap payoff P ( 1 ) for the first iteration based on the Equation 
(8.20); 
(3) Repeat steps (1) and (2) for N iterations and obtain ^K.J^^. 
(4) The cap value can then be calculated as: 
N XM V = e - r T x - ^ i (8.22) 
N 
8.3.4 Value at Risk and Stress Testing 
Value at Risk (VAR) is the primary measure of market risk exposure of a portfolio in 
practice. VaR is a summary measure of the downside risk, expressed in dollars. 
Generally speaking, VaR is defined as the maximum loss over a target horizon such 
that there is a low, pre-specified probability that the actual loss will be greater [160], 
In the proposed approach, the procedure of calculating VaR of a given portfolio can be 
summarized as: 
(1) Input the confidence level a, horizon T of VaR, and the iteration number N of 
the Monte Carlo simulation. 
(2) Based on the spot price model (8.1), (8.2) and (8.9), generate a simulated price 
series Y,, t = 1.. T; 
(3) Employ the approaches described in Section 8.3.2 to calculate the values of each 
position in the given portfolio, and sum the values to get the total portfolio value 
9 
(4) Repeat steps (2) and (3) for N times and obtain the simulated portfolio values 
V m , . . . V C N ) ; 
(5) Sort Vm,...Vw in the ascending order, select the a x N th and — th 
100 2 
simulated portfolio values. The VaR is then the difference between the two 
values. 
VaR is insufficient to measure the worst ever loss that could happen. Stress testing 
[160] should therefore be conducted to complement. Stress testing aims at identifying 
situations that could create extraordinary losses for the portfolio. In the electricity 
market, possible stress testing scenarios may include extreme price spike, negative 
price, system congestion and major system outage. The impacts of these extreme 
events on the portfolio should be evaluated. 
8.3.5 Kernel Based Regression 
Kernel Based Regression [154] is a class of algorithms for regression analysis, whose 
best known element is the SVM. Kernel based regression approach solves the problem 
by mapping the data into a high dimensional feature space, where each co-ordinate 
corresponds to one feature of the data items, transforming the data into a set of points 
in a Euclidean space. In that space, a variety of methods can be used to find relations 
in the data. Since the mapping can be quite general (not necessarily linear, for 
example), the relations found in this way are accordingly very general. This approach 
is called the kernel trick. 
Kernel methods owe their name to the use of kernel functions, which enable them to 
operate in the feature space without ever computing the coordinates of the data in that 
space, but rather by simply computing the inner products between the images of all 
pairs of data in the feature space. This operation is often computationally cheaper than 
the explicit computation of the coordinates. Kernel functions have been introduced for 
sequence data, graphs, text, images, as well as vectors. 
Algorithms which are capable of operating with kernels include SVM, Partial Least 
Square, Ridge Regression, and many others. Because of the particular culture of the 
research community that has been developing this approach since the mid-1990s, most 
kernel algorithms are based on convex optimization or eigenproblems, are 
computationally efficient and statistically well-founded. Typically, their statistical 
properties are analysed using statistical learning theory. In this study, the kernel based 
least square [154] method will be employed to estimate the relationship between the 
spot price and its relevant factors. 
8.4 Case Studies 
In this study, the historical contract price data of Australian market are selected to 
evaluate the performance of the proposed approach. The model generated swap and 
cap prices will firstly be compared with the historical prices to verify that the proposed 
contract pricing approach is effective. 
The authors firstly compare the actual forward curves of the first three quarters of 2008 
with the forward prices given by the proposed model. The characteristics, including 
mean, standard deviation (SD), and maximum (MAX) of the swap price data are given 
in Table 8-1: 
Table 8-1 The Characteristics of the Swap Price Data 
Q12008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 
Mean SD Max Mean SD Max Mean SD Max 
Peak 127.04 18.23 163 74.76 23.8 125 72.05 15.88 124 
Off-Peak 32.28 4.02 40.5 34.86 7.27 48 34.49 6.96 44.75 
Flat 73.34 8.74 87.7 51.85 14.07 78.58 51.07 10.3 79.47 
The model generated forward curves are given in Figs 8-2 - 8-10. 
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Figure 8-6 Model Generated Forward Prices for Quarter 2 2008 - Off-peak Load 
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Figure 8-10 Model Generated Forward Prices for Quarter 3 2008 - Flat 
As is shown in above figures, the forward curves, which are generated by the model, 
well approximate the actual forward curves for peak load, off-peak load and flat 
contracts. The Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) and Mean Absolute Percentage 
Error (MAPE) of the proposed model are given in Table 8-2. Considering the high 
volatility of the electricity market, the results are satisfactory. 
Table 8-2 RMSE and MAPE of The Proposed Model 
RMSE MAPE 
Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 Q12008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 
Peak 13.2886 8.0709 7.591 Peak 14.78% 12.33% 10.88% 
Off-peak 3.2628 3.5948 3.5798 Off-Peak 7.55% 6.98% 7.86% 
Flat 7.3847 5.6326 5.3036 Flat 9.06% 9.22% 9.16% 
In order to further test the effectiveness of the proposed model, the model generated 
cap prices are compared with the actual cap prices. The historical cap prices of the 
Victoria and Queensland markets for quarter 1, 2009 are selected. The characteristics 
of the data are given in Table 8-3. 
Table 8-3 The Characteristics of 2009 Q1 Cap Prices 
VIC market QLD market 
Mean 10.19 18.16 
SD 7.87 11.62 
Max 40.25 55.5 
The historical and model generated cap premiums are depicted in Figs 8-11 and 8-12. 
As clearly illustrated, the model generated cap prices are close to the actual cap prices, 
which demonstrates that the proposed pricing model works well. The RMSEs for 
Queensland and Victoria markets are 4.29 and 2.71 respectively, while the MAPEs are 
19.29% and 22.02%. 
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Figure 8-12 Actual Premium v.s. Model Premium for VIC Flat Contract 
To further investigate the performance of the proposed framework, this model is 
employed to estimate the VaR of five different portfolios. The horizons of risk 
assessment for the five portfolios are all set as from January 1st 2008 to March 31st 
2008. The risk free interest rate is assumed to be a fixed value of 7%. The definitions 
of the five portfolios are given in the Table 8-4. The positive symbol (+) denotes a 
long position while the negative (-) denotes a short position. It is assumed that the 
swap and cap are all Queensland flat contracts. 
Table 8-4 The Definitions of The Five Portfolios in The Proposed Framework 
Generator Hedged 
Generator 
Retailor Hedged 
Retailor 
Speculator 
Spot Market -6480 MWh -6480MWh +6480MWh +6480MWh 0 
Swap 0 -lOOOMWh 0 +lOOOMWh +lOOOMWh 
$300 Cap 0 0 0 +500MWh +500MWh 
The VaRs of the five portfolios are shown in Table 8-5: 
Table 8-5 The VaRs of The Five Portfolios 
Portfolio Generator Hedged Generator Retailor Hedged Retailor Speculator 
VaR ($) 763,710 278,640 763,710 502,890 978,340 
In the simulation, the portfolios of generator and retailer only have positions in the 
spot market, which indicates that they have unhedged exposure to the spot market risk. 
On the contrary, the hedged generator and hedged retailer portfolios use swap and cap 
to hedge the spot price risk. As expected, the generator and retailer that only have 
positions in the spot market have significantly greater VaR than the corresponding 
hedged portfolios, which indicates that the two derivatives effectively decrease the 
exposure of the two portfolios to the market risk. 
A special case is the speculator portfolio. The speculator does not employ derivatives 
for risk mitigation. On the contrary, it earns money by betting the market price will 
take a specific direction. In this study, it is assumed that the speculator predicts the 
market price tends to be high. It therefore takes long positions in both swap and cap 
contracts. As is shown, the speculator has the highest VaR even if it has a zero position 
in the spot market. 
8.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, a risk assessment framework is presented. The main contributions of 
this chapter include: 
(1) A comprehensive framework to assess the market risk exposure of a given 
portfolio. A mean-reverting jump-diffusion model is employed to model the spot 
electricity price, and a nonlinear regression technique is introduced to model the 
relationship between the spot price and relevant factors. Temperature impact on 
price is also considered in the framework; 
(2) Development of the capability of the framework to incorporate any electricity 
derivatives on a risk neural distribution in its risk assessment process; and 
(3) Value-at-risk (VaR) and stress testing based methods are developed as part of the 
framework to quantify the market risk exposure of a given portfolio. They 
altogether are able to give a comprehensive measurement of the market risk 
needed for the GENCO. 
It should be noted that the tool presented in this chapter completes the package of 
framework for GENCO risk management including strategic bidding and optimal 
portfolio selection. This chapter thus concludes the major contributions of this thesis. 
In the next chapter, conclusions and future work will be given. 
Chapter 9 
Conclusion and Future Work 
9.1 Conclusions 
This thesis reported the research findings of two main research problems and proposed 
corresponding solution methodologies, namely, generation strategic bidding and 
generation portfolio optimisation in an electricity market. These problems are basically 
optimisation problems; as such, a comprehensive overview of multi-objective 
optimisation problem formulation and algorithms are given in the thesis to form a 
mathematical foundation for various optimisation tasks involved. Electricity price 
forecasting is the key market signal in risk management for generators; and operations 
and planning for ISO. A novel price forecasting method is proposed in the thesis as 
well; it also provides a bridge between the two main research problems. Moreover, 
comprehensive approaches are also proposed for managing the risks of electricity 
trading. 
Firstly, a comprehensive review of generation bidding strategies is given, followed by 
detailed discussions on optimisation formulation and algorithms. The complexity of 
various optimisation problems through out the thesis requires advanced numerical 
methods. In this research, the following methods are investigated and utilised: 
• GA is the most widely used evolutionary algorithm with clear structures and 
distinct operators representing the natural evolution process in its search and 
optimisation process. GA is used in forming the framework of optimal bidding 
strategy with market uncertainties in the thesis. 
• Monte Carlo simulation, which is used widely in practice to obtain statistical 
information of a complex problem so as to assist the decision making process. It is 
particularly useful if the problem investigated can not be represented in an 
analytical form which can be studied by a deterministic approach. In this thesis, 
Monte Carlo simulation approach is used to obtain the optimal bidding strategies 
for a GENCO with only incomplete information from its rivals and the market. 
• DE, which is a relatively new evolutionary algorithm featured by structural 
simplicity and relatively higher computational efficiency. DE is used in the optimal 
portfolio selection process in Chapter 6 of the thesis. 
• FIA, as a new heuristic optimisation algorithm with better global search 
capabilities is used to build market clearing forecast model in the thesis. 
Other techniques used in the thesis include SVM and GARCH model to obtain optimal 
bidding strategies. 
In order to build optimal bidding strategies, two challenges have to be handled 
properly, namely, market uncertainties and incomplete information of rival generators 
in the market. Chapters 4-5 present a framework of optimal strategic bidding for 
generators considering such challenges. The framework presented in Chapter 4 
involves the following main steps: 
• Forecasting demand and price in the market; 
• Quantification of market uncertainties with data mining and statistical methods ; 
• Construction of bidding scenarios based on the results obtained in previous 
steps; 
• Optimisation of generator self-scheduling plans; and 
• Construction of bidding curves for each bidding scenarios. 
In Chapter 5, this process is further enhanced by a method to calculate MCP through 
its correlation with generators' bidding quantities in the market. 
For a generator, in addition to revenue obtained from spot market, it also uses other 
financial instruments to hedge the risks and maximise its return by selecting its 
portfolio in an optimal way. There are two major challenges to construct the optimal 
portfolio: 
• Generators' portfolio selection consists of many factors and it is difficult to 
develop a unified model for different markets and contracts; 
• The selected portfolio is optimal only in the theoretical sense. Its performance 
largely depends on accurately estimating the probability distributions of the 
returns of different markets and contracts. 
To address all these issues, a novel portfolio selection approach is proposed in Chapter 
6. It can be used for GENCOs to allocating its generation capacities in different 
markets and using contracts for risk management. The optimal portfolio is selected by 
optimising a utility function composed of portfolio return and risks. The proposed 
approach is applicable for handling different available assets in the electricity market. 
Moreover, it is able to provide better estimates of the distributions of asset returns by 
employing advanced statistical and econometrics methods. 
In all the methodologies proposed, MCP forecast is used through out. How to 
accurately forecast the MCP largely affects the performance of the propose bidding 
and portfolio selection methods. In Chapter 7, a new forecasting method is presented 
for price forecasting purpose. An advanced FIA based neural network model is 
developed to model and forecast the electricity price. It provides computational 
efficiency and accuracy in the forecasting process. It contributes to the overall 
methodology framework of generator bidding and portfolio selection approaches. 
These methods have been validated with realistic data from the Australian NEM. 
For risk management purpose, MCP forecast alone is not sufficient. In order to have a 
rather comprehensive methodology, an effective risk assessment method and portfolio 
evaluation framework was given in Chapter 8. In this framework, a mean-reverting 
model is applied to model the spot price. The relationship between the spot price and 
relevant factors has been modelled by a nonlinear regression technique. The risk 
neutral process of the spot price is also developed and presented. Finally VaR and 
stress testing methods are employed to quantify the market risk exposure of a given 
portfolio. Detailed case studies have been given to further validate the effectiveness of 
the proposed method and framework. 
Accordingly, the contributions of the thesis include 
• Development of a general framework for generator strategic bidding in an 
electricity market; 
• Development of methodologies to handle incomplete information in order to 
form more reliable and optimal bidding by generators in the market; 
• Construction of a framework for generator optimal portfolio selection in order 
to maximise return while containing risks in the market; 
- Development of an efficient price forecast model so as to form the basis for 
bidding and portfolio selection process; and 
• Development of methodologies to enhance the risk management practices of 
the market participants. 
Overall, this thesis provides a holistic view of generation risk management issues. It 
provides useful methodologies to meet the various challenges in an electricity market. 
9.2 Future Work 
Risk management for generators in an electricity market is a complex problem requires 
consideration of a variety of factors for different aspects. Although the thesis aims at 
providing a holistic view of generation risk management problem, however, there are 
further research topics identified though this research. The main topics for future work 
include the following: 
• Challenges from environmental market schemes and Carbon Pollution 
Reduction Scheme (CPRS) 
Generation sector is among those contributing the most to green house emissions. 
Consequently, the environmental market schemes have been introduced mainly 
targeting at the generation sector following the Kyoto protocol. The exact impact of 
environmental market schemes on the generation composition, profitability, 
dispatching order and generation new entry into the market is to be clearly depicted. 
However, it can be quite confidently anticipated that the generators in the Australian 
NEM will definitely be affected. There will be more renewable and combine cycle 
generators and less, if not completely no, coal fired power stations entering the market. 
Currently, the generation connection inquiries to the transmission network service 
providers by wind generators have been increasing rapidly in SA, VIC and TAS. 
Another important fact to be considered in this aspect is the CPRS promoted by the 
Australian government. On 27 April 2010, it had been announced that Government 
would not introduce the CPRS until after the end of the current commitment period of 
the Kyoto Protocol (which ends in 2012) and only when there is greater clarity on the 
actions of other major economies including the US, China and India. The government 
expects that CPRS can guarantee that Australia is to reduce its emissions to 25% of 
below 2000 levels by 2020 if the world agrees to a 450 parts per million C02 target, 
otherwise a reduction of 5-15% below 2000 levels by 2020 is expected, [161]. The 
environmental market schemes and CPRS impact will have to be considered in 
forming optimal bidding strategies and selecting optimal portfolios by generators in 
the Australian NEM. 
• Distributed Generation (DG) and its impact on GENCOs' bidding behaviour 
DG in the Australian NEM grid has been increasing over the past few years. Although 
the current penetration has not reached a level so as to have evident impact on the spot 
market, however, with the environmental market schemes, CPRS and sustainable 
development vision, it is expected that more and more DG will be installed in the 
system. Consequently, they will have evident impact on the generation market when 
their penetration level is high enough. This forms another important future research 
topic. 
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Appendix 
The Australian National Electricity Market (NEM) consists of 5 interconnected 
regional markets including Queensland (QLD), New South Wales (NSW), Victoria 
(VIC), South Australia (SA) and Tasmania (TAS). The interconnectors of these 
regions and their geographic locations are shown below: 
